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Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts:
Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level
Kathryn L. Boyd
INTRODUCTION
A wave of suits by victims of human rights abuses abroad
suing large corporations in U.S. federal courts is affecting the
normative and procedural development of domestic and international law. Corporations have become the defendants of
choice for classes of foreign plaintiffs suing in U.S. courts for
international law violations.1 Large entities, including Unocal,
Texaco, Degussa, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, Volkswagen, and
Swiss, German, French, and Austrian banks have all been targeted in international human rights suits in federal court by
classes of plaintiffs alleging that their rights have been violated
under customary international law (“CIL”) and demanding
large-scale monetary and injunctive relief.2 The alleged of1. Many of the corporate entities are large transnational corporations. The definition of transnational corporations (TNCs) (also referred to as “multinational corporations” (MNCs) or “multinational enterprises” (MNEs)) according to the U.N. Draft Code
of Conduct on TNCs, is an enterprise
comprising entities in two or more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields
of activity of these entities, which operate under a system of decision-making,
permitting coherent policies and a common strategy through one or more decision-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over
the activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others.

Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Organizational Sess. for
1988, Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add. 1 (1988); see also
PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (1995) (defining
“multinational enterprise” as an enterprise that engages in direct investment outside
their home countries and including corporate groups based on parent-subsidiary relations alone).
2. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959, 1999 WL 719888
(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1999); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La.
1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
850 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated sub nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153
(2d Cir. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (mem.).; Class
Action Complaint, Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, No. 98-3598, 1999 WL 717260
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fenses take place in faraway places and often in faraway times.
Moreover, the plaintiffs allege violations of international, not
U.S., law. For example, families of Holocaust victims have filed
class actions for abuses that occurred over fifty years ago in
Europe when Swiss banks and other corporate entities cooperated with the Nazi government.3 Convergence of the uniquely
American class action procedure and the substantive international law of human rights not only affects the development of
international human rights norms but may finally achieve the
elusive goal of compliance with international norms.4
This new trend of “mass tort” transnational litigation is an

(D.N.J. Sept. 13, 1999); Complaint, Pollack v. Seimens AG, No. 98-CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1999); Complaint, Polgar v. Daimler Chrysler, No. 99-CV-02527
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 1999); Complaint, Duveen v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 99-CV0388 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 19, 1999); Complaint, Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp AG, No. 98-CV4280 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 11, 1998); Complaint, Gross v. Volkswagen, No. 98-CV-4104
(D.N.J. filed Aug. 31, 1998); Complaint, Watman v. Deutsche Bank, No. 98-CV-3938
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 3, 1998); Amended Complaint, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. 97
Civ. 7433 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 20, 1998); Complaint, Kor v. Bayer, 99-CV-0036 (S.D.
Ind. filed Feb. 17, 1998) (claims by Holocaust survivors for injuries suffered from death
camp experiments).
3. Several class action suits were brought (and settled) against Swiss banks
(Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, and Swiss Bank Corporation as joint defendants) by Holocaust survivors and the relatives of Holocaust victims in an effort to
recover money deposited in Swiss bank accounts prior to and during World War II.
Joined were Holocaust survivors who were forced by Nazis to engage in slave labor and
Holocaust survivors and heirs of Holocaust victims who had property looted by Nazis.
The “Holocaust Plaintiffs” claimed that Swiss banks actively financed and knowingly
accepted profits derived from slave labor as well as looted assets. See Amended Complaint, World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc. v. Union Bank of Switz.,
No. 97-CV-0461 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 1997); Amended Complaint, Friedman v. Union
Bank of Switz., No. 96-CV-5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996); Amended Complaint,
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-CV-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 3, 1996), consolidated as Telling-Grotch v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed 1996).
4. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in THE
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 3-5 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999) (describing the contemporary accounts of the law of nations
stress the convergence of international and domestic law, or “intermestic” law, whereby
domestic law has been internationalized and international law has been domesticated).
Compliance with international law, and in particular human rights law, has been the
subject, even obsession, of modern international lawyers and scholars. See, e.g., ABRAM
CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (4th ed. 1994). Enforcement measures such as use of
international fact-finding, surveillance, and peacekeeping forces for aid in enforcement,
collective nonrecognition of unlawful acts, and diplomatic pressures will not be discussed in this article. However, most governments are ambivalent about the enforcement of international law when it would disadvantage them. See OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 245 (1991).

BOYD-FIN.DOC

1139]

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

4/5/00 7:18 AM

1141

inevitable development both in human rights litigation in the
U.S. and in the realm of international human rights law in
general. While federal courts have long been the forum for litigation of private rights and economic disputes involving corporations, this “new wave” of class litigation involves public international norms in a new context.5
Private civil tort remedies have been available in the U.S.
for almost twenty years since the Second Circuit ruled that the
dormant Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) could be the basis of
federal court subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought
by an alien against a foreign government official for violations
of CIL, or “violations of the law of nations.”6 However, only

5. Professors Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes describe the environment
and human rights as part of “the ‘third wave’ issues that do not yield . . . readily to the
calculus of power and interest, in contrast to the first and second wave preoccupation
with physical and economic security, which have increasingly shouldered their way
onto the international agenda.” ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 123
(1995); see generally, GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 17-18 (1996) (describing the distinction between “public” and “private”
international law); Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights
Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 236-37 (1995/1996)
(comparing private international law and enforcement of economic rights by U.S.
courts in order to protect capital markets and voluntary market exchange). “The fact
that economic activity throughout the world has become so complex and interrelated
has meant both more assertions of jurisdictional authority and more resistance to such
assertions.” SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 252. Controversies in the U.S. in the past
have been with:
1) The application of United States law to prohibit foreign companies abroad that
are substantially owned or controlled by United States nationals from doing business with persons in countries deemed “enemies” of the United States (such as, at
one time, China, Cuba, Iran and USSR). . . .
2) The application of United States antitrust laws to conduct outside the United
States by non-nationals of the United States . . . when such conduct has a substantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce [(the “effects doctrine”)].
...
3) Orders by United States judicial or administrative authorities addressed to foreign firms or individuals for disclosure of documents located in another State for
use in judicial or administrative proceedings in the United States without the
permission of the State in which the persons or documents are located.
4) Withholding payments due to a foreign company or individual located abroad
for the purpose of enforcing United States tax laws or restricting transfer of funds
held in foreign branches of United States banks to persons subject to investigation
or prosecution in the United States.

Id.
6. The Alien Tort Claims Act provides: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); see Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding ATCA provides federal court
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since the case brought against Radovan Karadzic in 1996 have
nongovernmental defendants been held liable under ATCA’s
jurisdiction, paving the way for class action suits against corporations whose international activity causes mass harm.7
With the globalization of the economy, corporations continue to move into expanding markets in Asia, Eastern Europe,
and Latin America.8 Ironically, corporations, as powerful international actors, play a dual role of enhancing basic human
rights by eliminating poverty and misery in under-developed
countries, while simultaneously pursuing profit at the expense
of the weakest individuals.9 Corporate activity, particularly in
the form of investment, generates economic development, a
necessary condition for achieving human rights.10 Conversely,
jurisdiction for alien to sue for violations of customary international law).
7. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that subject-matter jurisdiction exists, that Karadzic may be found liable for genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity and for other violations in
his capacity as a state actor, and that he is not immune from service of process.”).
8. Transnational corporations differ from multi-location domestic enterprises in
a number of ways, including their capacity to locate productive facilities across national borders, to exploit local factor inputs thereby, to trade across frontiers in factor
inputs between affiliates, to exploit their know-how in foreign markets without losing
control over it, and to organize their managerial structure globally according to the
most suitable mix of divisional lines of authorities. These factors permit multinationals
to affect the international allocation of productive resources. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1
at 15; see also THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982). The usual
indicators of development are mainly industrialization, the growth of capital, and the
application of technology and increase in GNP, which the entrance of multinationals to
a country usually brings. In the 1950s and 1960s, a considerable shift in “development
ideology” occurred. SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 350. Resolutions of the U.N. recognized that economic growth alone was not enough, but that human welfare should be
the focus. In the 1980s, a new “development ideology moved to the forefront,” focusing
on “reliance on the market, and skepticism about the ability of governments to achieve
development.” Id. at 350. The U.N. has recently proclaimed a “’human right to development’ which many construe as imposing an obligation on the part of developed countries to assist the needy countries.” Id. at 355.
9. There is a distinction between abusive economic corporate activity and activity which rises to the level of a violation of fundamental human rights or criminal activity; however, where that line is drawn is not always clear given the amorphous human rights standards. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes; see also Jack
Donnelly, Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns?,
in 36 WORLD POLITICS 255 (1984); C.H. Schreuer, The Impact of International Institutions on the Protection of Human Rights in Domestic Courts, 4 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 60
(1974).
10. See David Kinley, The Legal Dimension of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 6 (David Kinley ed., 1998) (noting the concern in developing nations that economic development is ahead of guaranteeing human rights); see also Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 41st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1987) (proclaiming the right to development to be a
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such development often results in conditions that are inimical
to human rights. Moreover, governments curtail human rights
for the sake of economic development.11
Increasingly, the public has pressured U.S. companies to
avoid marketing products produced by forced labor. Moreover,
the companies have decided to restrict investments in countries
known for human rights abuses (such as Burma and China).12
These decisions reflect an increasing sensitivity toward corporate involvement in international law violations. Those victimized by corporate activity now seek private redress for alleged
violations of public law norms, further evidencing a commitment to the idea that both the authority of State and the role of
market, in principle, are limited by legal commitments to human rights.13 Disagreement and debate about the role and siguniversal and inalienable right, nonetheless stressing the fact that it is also integral
part of fundamental human rights which are interrelated and interdependent (arts.
1(2) and 6(2)); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
163-202 (1989) (asserting that development strategies should seek to minimize the
shortfalls of three common trade-offs: needs, equality, and liberty).
11. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging that
the government authorized and participated in forcing natives to relocate, subjected
them to forced labor, death, or torture, and committed other human rights violations);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
1994) (alleging that Ecuador harmed the indigenous people who were living in the rainforest); see also Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land: Cultural Land and
Transnational Corporations–Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 331, 353-54 (1998) (discussing multinationals link to environmental damage in
sharp contrast to Transnational Corporations Code of Conduct).
12. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 153, 157-58; see also, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994) (prohibiting grant of most
favored nations status to countries with non-market economies that deny their citizens
the rights or opportunity to emigrate); 22 U.S.C. § 2151(n) (1990) (Prohibition Against
Foreign Assistance to Gross Violators of Human Rights, prohibiting economic aid to
countries engaged in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”); Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration, Annex I, at 5-8, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.177/20 (1995);.
13. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 434, 509
(1990) (defining “international responsibility” which relates both to breaches of treaty
and other breaches of legal duty); cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (recognizing the growing pressure to extend liability to private actors but refusing to do so on the facts of the case); Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.Cal 1997); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D.
Cal. 1987). In the absence of compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms, such disputes
are often resolved through diplomatic exchange and negotiated settlement. See id.; see
also Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime? 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 588-89 (1997); see generally, STEPHEN R.
RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (1997) (pointing out the erro-
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nificance of companies in this geo-political realm is the backdrop of the new wave of class litigation.14
U.S. law has ample substantive theories and procedural
mechanisms that permit the joinder of nongovernmental defendants who cooperate with and support governmental human
rights abuses.15 Unlike government officials, corporations with
ties to the U.S., are more easily found for jurisdictional purposes.16 Human rights plaintiffs’ attorneys need not worry

neous assumption that international law never applies to non-state actors).
14. See International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1967);
DONALDSON, supra note 8, at 11-12; see generally RICHARD J. BARNET & RONALD E.
MÜLLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974)
(describing the global influence of multinational corporations); LOUIS TURNER,
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1973) (describing the economic,
social, and political influence of multinational corporations on Third World countries).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 20. As in the earlier human rights cases, plaintiffs allege that the corporate defendant joined in committing a “tort . . . in violation of the law
of nations” in order for the ATCA to provide jurisdiction. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at
890. For example, in the case against Unocal, the district court used theories of joint
liability to find that Unocal acted under color of law with the military government, the
SLORC, that was widely condemned for its 1988 crackdown and campaign of repression against the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. See id. at 892. Unocal and its
executives who violated international law were subject to suit under the ATCA.
Although there is no allegation that SLORC is physically selling Burmese citizens
to the private defendants, plaintiffs allege that, despite their knowledge of
SLORC’s practice of forced labor, both in general and with respect to the pipeline
project, the private defendants have paid and continue to pay SLORC to provide
labor and security for the pipeline, essentially treating SLORC as an overseer, accepting the benefit of and approving the use of forced labor.

Id.
Unocal vigorously den[ied] these allegations . . . and point[ed] to the company’s
humanitarian projects in Myanmar, such as the construction of schools, animal-breeding farms, and hospitals. In a press conference . . . Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck stated that “I do
not, I want to make very clear, have any information to suggest that Unocal itself
uses forced labor. . . . I’m persuaded that [Unocal is] very much trying to avoid under any circumstances the use of forced labor.”

Gregory J. Wallance, Linked to Slavery Doe v. Unocal Asks Whether American Companies Should Be Held Responsible for the Human Rights Abuses of the Foreign Governments That Are Their Business Partners, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. B0-001E (June-July
1998).
16.
Jurisdiction to adjudicate has been generally based on territoriality or nationality .
. . . Thus, the defendant’s presence, or his conduct or ownership of property . . .
within the territory have been considered sufficient for a court to adjudicate the
case. . . . A defendant, whose conduct outside the State had a substantial and foreseeable effect within the State . . . has also been considered subject to judicial jurisdiction. . . . States may also adjudicate cases involving domestic law based on
protective, universal or passive jurisdiction . . . provided the defendant is present
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about governmental immunities.17 Furthermore, plaintiffs can
readily enforce their judgments because they can easily access
the assets of transnational enterprises.
Not only are domestic theories of joint liability expanding
concepts of private liability for international law violations in
the new class suits, but the application of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure itself may also affect the development of the substantive human rights being asserted.
Classes of human rights victims are asserting jurisdiction in
federal court on the basis that their rights were violated as collective entities. Moreover, federal courts are being asked to find
and interpret customary international norms, such as cultural
and economic rights for groups, that earlier cases against governments and officials did not address. In this procedural posture, the adjudication of collective rights has pushed the margins of what has been considered “fundamental” or “universal”
in human rights law.
In both international and domestic contexts, the procedural
joinder mechanism is Rule 23. The application of Rule 23 to enforce collective claims expands and solidifies notions of amorphous substantive international human rights law. The result
is a dynamic symbiosis of international and domestic law,
whereby United States federal court procedure and substantive
international law merge into domestic federal common law,
which in turn establishes precedent for international tribunals
and institutions.18
This article focuses on the procedural mechanism of the
class action under Rule 23 and its substantive effect in transnational human rights litigation. In a general critique of the
class litigation against former president of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos, Professor Steinhardt summarily dismissed the
class action device for mass human rights cases as compromising the autonomy of the human rights victims.19 However,
in the State.”

SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 255-56.
17. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885-88 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (refusing
to dismiss for act of state or Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
18. This is a clear example of the transnational public law litigation, described by
Professor Koh, in which the transnational nature of the party and claim structure is as
focused on obtaining judicial declaration of transnational norms as upon resolving past
disputes. See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2371 (1991).
19. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filàrtiga: Litigating Hu-
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there has been no in-depth analysis of the effects of class structure on the development or objectives of substantive or procedural international human rights law. More particularly, there
has been no analysis of whether the gains to collective justice
justify the sacrifice of autonomy in the class suit. This article
attempts to establish the beginnings of an analytical framework, setting forth the practical and theoretical effects of class
joinder on the enforcement of the substantive law of human
rights.
Moreover, commentators have long questioned the proper
function of U.S. courts in the international legal order.20 Drawing from their history of class litigation, the federal courts’
process of interpreting international norms is unique in the
arena of international institutions.21 This article explores the
federal courts’ role as standard-maker for international class
suits within the transnational dialogue between international
institutions and federal courts.22
man Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 65, 93
(1995). Professor Steinhardt pointed out difficulties, such as confusion of causation issues and impairment of jury function, impairment of client-counsel relationship, and
overreaching by judges during the pretrial and settlement phases. These are common
criticisms by opponents of class actions in general. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); Robert G.
Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV 213 (1990) (book review) [hereinafter Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms]; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court”
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking]; Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical
Adjudication]; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice
by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Individual Justice
by Collective Means]; David Rosenberg, Doing Individual Justice and Collectivizing
Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing]; David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 695 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Lessons from a Special Master].
20. See Christenson, supra note 5, at 225; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
5, at 1-28.
21. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 122 (interpretive process—applying
general language of norm to concrete cases—is characteristic of all legal norms which
in U.S. legal system the judiciary is major player while international system does “not
have the benefit of much judicial assistance”).
22. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2353 (resulting transnational body of law that
blends domestic and international law, as opposed to dualistic view of law). “Robert C.
Clark argues that parallel developments on the domestic scene have created a demand
for the ‘potentially enormous’ contribution of law and lawyers in ‘stabilizing expectations and reducing the transaction costs of later misunderstandings, conflicts and dispute resolution.’ ” CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 123-24.
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Part I of the article briefly describes the recent history of
class action suits brought on behalf of human rights victims
against corporations, exploring more closely how Rule 23’s procedural mechanisms are applied to human rights plaintiffs as a
practical matter. Part II identifies the role of class action suits
in the evolution of human rights law from a focus on individual
rights to a focus on collective rights, particularly the cultural
and economic rights of groups. This part explores how the
structure of the class suit provides a means for developing new
substantive international law norms through the judicial pronouncement of class definitions. Part III discusses the collective remedies that are most appropriate for human rights
classes and best satisfy the objectives of human rights law,
such as developing collective rights upon which claims may be
found and allowing victims a voice in the international community. Part IV reviews the lack of enforcement of human
rights laws against corporations acting in the global economy
and argues that compliance is achieved by permitting individuals access to transnational litigation through class action suits.
Part V argues that, in practice and theory, the objectives of
human rights law justify collective treatment of human rights
claims. Collective adjudication does not compromise rights of
class members under rights-based theories of participation, or
under human rights law. This article concludes that the United
States federal courts play a crucial role in the development of
procedural and substantive international law, as well as in the
enforcement of those norms through the class action litigation
of international human rights violations against private corporations.
I. THE RISING ROLE OF THE CLASS ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION
A. Human Rights as a Source of Law in U.S. Courts
There is no requirement in international law that countries
provide remedies for individuals whose rights have been violated.23 Since 1980, however, private persons have sought re23. The general rule is that the States afford foreigners access to the courts—but
not specifically for international law. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 240-41. In some
cases, a State is explicitly or implicitly obliged to provide legislation and/or remedies
in domestic courts for individuals adversely affected by a treaty violation. See id. A
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dress in U.S. federal courts for human rights violations.24 Thus,
the enforcement of international human rights law through
private causes of action in U.S. courts is an exception to the basic postulate of international law that obligations run from the
state to other states or organizations of states.25
Human rights law has revolutionized the field of international law.26 In the nineteenth century, human beings were not
recognized under international law; their rights were derived
from the rights of states. What the state did to its own citizens
within its own territory was a matter of “domestic jurisdiction,”
a private law concept.27 After World War II, the idea of international human rights law was universally acknowledged, as evidenced by the ratification by forty-eight countries of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.28 Enforcement of

State may meet its obligation through executive or other non-judicial means. See id.
24. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 240. It is more difficult to determine
whether international CIL rules require domestic judicial remedies for individuals.
25. See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (1996) (describing international law as a “body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized
states in their relations with one another”). An example is the Iran-U.S. arbitral tribunal in the Hague, created in 1981 as part of the settlement following the Tehran hostage crisis where U.S. nationals could bring claims against Iran without intercession by
the U.S. government. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 239-40.
26. There are three sources of international law: “1) international agreements, 2)
CIL, and 3) general principles of law.” Statute of International Court of Justice, Art. 38
(1). “In theory, these sources are of equal weight. . . . however, the best accepted
sources of what is international law are international agreements. . . . International
agreements [may include] treaties, conventions, concordants, and exchanges of notes.”
BORN, supra note 5, at 18. U.S. courts distinguish between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties as a source of private rights in federal law. See id. at 19. “A selfexecuting treaty has immediate legal effect within the contracting States, without the
need for implementing legislation or regulations; a non-self-executing treaty is not intended to have direct legal effect, but instead contemplates domestic enabling legislation.” Id. at 19-20; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(3) &
(4) & cmt. h (1987).
27. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filàrtiga v. PeñaIrala, in THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 70-74 (Ralph G.
Steinhardt & Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999).
28. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Standard of Achievement (visited Aug. 9, 1999)
<http://www.udhr50.org/history/default.htm>. “The Universal Declaration was not intended as a binding instrument, and there is no persuasive argument that article 25 is
CIL. However, similar provisions have become part of other instruments that are intended to be binding, most prominently the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human
Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1382 (1999).
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international human rights law began with Nuremberg,29
which recognized crimes against humanity and began a form of
politics that favored intervention on behalf of individual rights,
even when violations of those rights occurred within the
boundaries of sovereign states.30 The body of international human rights law since World War II has “established the principle that international law limits a State’s treatment of its own
nationals.”31 This international norm paved the way for detailed statements of internationally protected rights.32
There is great debate over whether human rights law become part of CIL.33 This is, in part, because of the difficulty of
even defining CIL and human rights. International human
rights law has been subject to little judicial interpretation. Indeed, a precise definition of human rights in general is widely
debated.34 CIL is a dynamic body of law, evolving with the in-

29. The Nuremberg trials and the Genocide Convention effectively destroyed the
earlier classic conception. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 61
(Anthony D’Amato and Kirsten Engel, eds., 1996).
30. See David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 SOC. RESEARCH 779, 787
(1987) (noting the counter pull toward statism); see also Ted Baggett, Recent Development, Human Rights Abuses in Yugoslavia: To Bring an End to Political Oppression,
the International Community Should Assist in Establishing an Independent Kosovo, 27
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 457 (1999) (discussing human rights as the impetus for intervention).
31. Stephens, supra note 13, at 588. See also BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL
RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 58-89 (1996) (discussing seven international torts which fall under the ATCA).
32. See Draft International Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/777 (Dec.
7, 1948) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration].
33. SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 335.
34. See Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), disavowed by Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (“There has been little judicial interpretation of what constitutes the law of nations and no universally accepted definition of
this phrase.”); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing the
lack of precedent interpreting the ATCA, especially with respect to the term “law of
nations”). The U.S. Supreme Court has not reviewed the modern use of ATCA as the
basis for human rights liability. The First and Second Circuits accept the fluid definition set forth in Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) and Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). This is contrasted with
the intra-circuit disagreement among three concurring judges in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit
dodged the issue of determining proper definition for law of nations in Carmichael v.
United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (1988) (affirming dismissal of a British national’s
allegation under ATCA of torture and imprisonment in Saudi Arabia). The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits have not addressed the issue, although both courts seem to be on the
Filàrtiga/Kadic sideline. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
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ternational community and its consciousness.35 The changing
nature of CIL is in part due to its definition, which is both objective (State practice), as well as subjective (opinio juris, or the
legal and moral expectations of society).36 Finding sufficient
evidence of State practice and opinio juris for a CIL norm requires courts to delve into nontraditional analysis. Courts consider whether the norm is incorporated in national constitutions and laws and whether it is frequently referred to in U.N.
resolutions and declarations condemning specific human rights
violations.37 Statements by national officials criticizing other
States for serious human rights violations, “dictum of the International Court of Justice that obligations erga omnes in international law include those derived ‘from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,’ [and]
some [international court] . . . decisions . . . that refer to the
Universal Declaration as a source of standards for judicial decision[s]” are sufficient evidence of the existence of a CIL
norm.38
Where domestic legal systems do provide remedies for violations of international law (either by their constitution or
common or statutory law declaring CIL part of domestic law),
international human rights law is said to be “internalized” or
“incorporated” into domestic law.39 Heated debate has erupted
35. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the importance of using “evolving standards of international law” when considering scope of
ATCA’s coverage); Filàrtiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (reasoning that jurisdictional questions
“ ‘must be considered part of an organic growth—part of the evolutionary process’ ”
(quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959)).
But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring) (“[I]n 1789 there was no concept of international human rights.”); id. at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring) (intimating a
degree of judicial progressiveness by citing the Supreme Court’s determination in 1887
that counterfeiting was a violation of the law of nations in U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479
(1887), but not adopting the Second Circuit’s views).
36. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 338.
37. See id. at 336-37.
38. Id. at 336 (quoting 1970 I.C.J. 33). The U.N. Charter, to which virtually all
States adhere, includes a “pledge” to act “for the achievement of inter alia, ‘universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms for all without distinctions
to race, sex, language or religion.’ ” See id. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948 was followed 20 years later by the two international covenants on human
rights. See id. A body of law exists specifying human rights obligations in detail and
providing means of “implementation” to bring about compliance; however, neither governments nor courts have accepted the Universal Declaration as an instrument with
obligatory force. See id. at 337.
39. See Edward M. Morgan, Internalization of Customary International Law: An
Historical Perspective, 12 YALE J. INT’L L. 63 (1987). With treaties, incorporation de-
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over the very existence of international human rights law as
part of federal common law, upon which human rights victims
may ground their claims in U.S. courts.40 The history of granting relief to alien plaintiffs under international human rights
law in the United States began with the 1980 Filartiga v. PeñaIrala case. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit revived the twohundred-year-old Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) to find federal
court jurisdiction over a suit by an alien against a Paraguayan
government official for torture committed in Paraguay.41 The
Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs could sue the official
under ATCA because torture violated CIL.42 After Filartiga,
other human rights victims sued foreign governments and officials in U.S. courts for offenses such as genocide, torture, summary execution, and disappearances, all of which are considered violations of the “law of nations.”43 It became settled that

pends on whether the treaties are “self executing” and therefore readily capable of direct application by a court without legislation. See BORN supra note 5, at 19-20. Some
countries’ constitutions, such as Austria, Germany, and Italy’s, expressly provide that
CIL is part of domestic law “on the same footing as statutes,” but subject to constitutional precepts. SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 242; Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 27
(discussing the readiness of some courts (the U.S. courts specifically) to grant private
rights of actions for international human rights).
40. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Federal Courts]; Ryan Goodman & Derek P.
Jinks, Filàrtiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common
Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).
41. See Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1980); Harold
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
42. See Filàrtiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
43. See, e.g., Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (dismissing a Holocaust survivor’s suit for money damages pursuant to the Federal Sovereign Immunities
Act); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (nine Gautemalan nationals
brought suit against former general and defense minister for atrocities committed under his command); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing
claims for money damages sought by widow of political opponent of exiled President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti due to head-of-state immunity); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987) (including “(a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights”); U.N. Declaration, supra note 32; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1; Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1292 (1975); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2,
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foreign states and officials were bound by CIL, for which the
Act provides jurisdiction.44
Since Filartiga, human rights plaintiffs have encountered
substantial procedural obstacles in suits against corrupt governments or government officials, including immunity doctrines such as head-of-state and sovereign immunity,45 the act
of state doctrine,46 forum non conveniens,47 and the virtual im1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6.
44. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844
(11th Cir. 1996); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff’d, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (discussing the debate among circuits
over subject matter jurisdiction versus private right of action); Federal Courts, supra
note 40, at 2262-67.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994) (the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976);
Siderman de Blake v. Argentina 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (action for torture and
expropriation against Argentina based on commercial activity exception to FSIA and
implied waiver of immunity); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885-86 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)). The late Professor Lillich noted, “The courts repeatedly have rejected arguments that a ‘human rights’ or ‘jus
cogens’ exception to the FSIA exists, most recently giving them an ‘ignominious burial’ ” in Princz v. F.R.G. Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 27 (1995/1996); see
Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing jus cogens); see also Smith v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a suit brought by representative of victims of Pan American Flight 103 bombing against government of Libya). But see Hilao
v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that state actors may
not hide behind FSIA when their actions exceed scope of their authority); Hari M.
Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity From Severe Human Rights Violations: New Directions for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 35, 44-45 (1998);
Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International
Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2132, 2152 (1995) (arguing both that the
FSIA does not mandate dismissal of ATCA claims brought against individuals who
have violated “fundamental norms of international law” regardless of whether individual is state actor and that jus cogens norms should serve as guide to what constitutes
implied waiver under FSIA); Recent Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 513, 518 (criticizing the
Princz court’s decision as exceedingly narrow regarding federal jurisdiction over foreign
sovereign).
46. See Philippines v. Marcos II, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988);
SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 243-44 (the Act of State Doctrine in the U.S. “accords a
conclusive presumption of validity to the foreign Act of State (excluding . . . exceptions .
. . )” even if it contravenes CIL); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964) (rationale includes respect for sovereignty of States in matters over
which they have territorial jurisdiction). Deference to sovereign acts of foreign States
may not be defensible, however, where CIL clearly prohibits acts such as genocide, systematic racial discrimination, or arbitrary and discriminatory seizures of property. See
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 894 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating in dicta that act of
state doctrine would not preclude suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 given the high degree of
international consensus that jus cogens norm violations are internationally denounced,
undermining the defendant’s arguments that SLORC and MOGE activities should be
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possibility of enforcing judgments.48 Domestic courts have also
been reticent to give relief to private persons injured by acts of
a government that contravened international obligations vis-àvis sovereign states, such as those prohibiting use of force
against another state or requiring compliance with mandatory
decisions of the U.N. Security Council.49
However, U.S. courts for the most part have incorporated
CIL into the federal common law.50 The question, then, is to
what extent the courts may participate in the development of
substantive rights and obligations under CIL in their application of procedural rules. This article addresses this question.
B. Recognizing a Human Rights Class Action
Groups of human rights plaintiffs now stand to influence,
and potentially benefit from, the development of federal court

treated as acts of the state).
47. See Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non
Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 41, 44-46 (1998); cf.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 99-7223 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 1999) (citing
“‘Order’ (AI-19)” S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998, which dismissed ATCA case against foreign
corporations on grounds of forum non conveniens); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153
(2d Cir. 1998); Brief for Defendants-Appellees-Cross Appellants, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 08386 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996).
48. To address this problem, thirty-five countries have been negotiating the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Foreign Judgments under the auspices
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law since 1993. The Hague Conference must approve, and the United States must sign, the Convention. See Memorandum from Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld to The Council through Professor Geoffrey
Hazard Re: Proposal for Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention 1 (Nov. 30,
1998), available at <http://www.ali.org/ali/1999_Lowen1.htm> (visited June 16, 1999) .
49. U.S. courts have concluded that these are political questions. See
SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 242-43; see, e.g., U.S. v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 342
(D. Md. 1968).
50. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66
(New York, Harper & Bros. 1854) (“[T]he law of nations . . . is here adopted in its full
extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”). In Kadic,
the Court declined to extend 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction to encompass all alleged violations of international law, therefore leaving an unresolved relationship between section 1331 and violations of “law of nations.” See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d
Cir. 1995); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (asserting that § 1331 requires an express or implied
remedy from the law of nations but that §1350 provides jurisdiction over violations of
the law of nations). The courts in Filartiga and Kadic dodged the issue by noting that
since the ATCA apparently provided the appellants a remedy, there was no need to decide whether a non-statutory based claim of international law violations should be incorporated into U.S. law under § 1331. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246; Filàrtiga v. PeñaIrala , 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
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class adjudication. For example, the class action brought on
behalf of almost ten thousand human rights victims in the
Philippines during martial law under Ferdinand Marcos resulted in a settlement of $1.2 billion in exemplary damages and
$766 million in compensatory damages.51 In the first phase of
the jury trial, the representative plaintiffs established that
Marcos was liable to the class for torture, summary executions,
and disappearances through a statistical expert’s testimony regarding the extent of the human rights violations based on a
sampling of victims in the Philippines.52
Similarly, the Second Circuit held that Radovan Karadzic
was liable as an individual to the class who brought an action
against Karadzic for international wrongs, thus identifying
non-state individuals as potential defendants in human rights
class action suits.53 In the case against Karadzic, Croat and
Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought suit under
ATCA for genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity, 54 alleging they were victims or survivors of victims of
Karadzic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing. After the Second Circuit held that Karadzic was subject to suit under ATCA in his
private capacity, the district court on remand certified the class
and has proceeded into discovery despite challenges to the
class.55
Following Kadic, class actions against corporate entities for
51. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996).
52. See generally, Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83
IOWA L. REV. 545, 548-49 (1998).
53. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-44 (stating that Bosnian-Serb leader may be found
liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity);
Alan Frederick Enslen, Commentary, Filàrtiga’s Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act with Its Decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV. 695 (1997); Lawrence Newman & Michael Burrows, International Litigation: The Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1995, at 3. In 1988, the
Fifth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the ATCA conferred subject matter jurisdiction over private entities who conspired in official acts of torture by one nation
against a citizen of another. See Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th
Cir. 1988) (dismissing suit by British plaintiff against American employer for failure to
show that employer had conspired with Saudi Arabia against him). The D.C. Circuit
had previously held that the ATCA did not cover the conduct of non-state actors. See
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
775 (Edwards, J., concurring).
54. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
55. See Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 CIV. 0878, 1999 WL 6360 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999)
(denying motion to certify decision to deny opt out rights for interlocutory appeal); Doe
v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying plaintiff’s motion to opt out of
23(b)(1)(B) class).

BOYD-FIN.DOC

1139]

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

4/5/00 7:18 AM

1155

human rights abuses have been brought in two principle areas:
1) human rights violations related to environmental harm
caused by multinational corporations acting with foreign governments;56 and 2) human rights violations by foreign banks
and corporations acting with the Nazi government during the
Holocaust.57
In 1996, on the heels of Kadic, Burmese farmers brought a
class action suit in federal court against Unocal, Total S.A., a
French petroleum company, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), and individual executives of Unocal.58 Plaintiffs
sought injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief for international human rights violations (forced labor, crimes
against humanity, torture, violence against women, arbitrary
arrest and detention, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment) committed in furtherance of the defendants’ Yadana gas
pipeline project.59
Also in 1996, nearly 900,000 victims and survivors of the
Holocaust filed a class action suit against the three largest
Swiss banks alleging that the banks participated with the Nazi
56. See e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366, 369 (E.D.
La. 1997) (on appeal) (involving leader of Indonesian tribe who brought suit against a
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation that operates copper, gold, and silver mines in Irian
Jaya, Indonesia, alleging human rights and international environmental law violations
and violations by security personnel at Freeport’s mine which included torture, execution, arrests and detentions, and international environmental torts); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994), dismissed,
945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing action based on international comity, forum non conveniens, and failure to join an indispensable party), and vacated sub nom.,
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). The Amungme people also filed a class
action suit in Louisiana district court alleging Freeport “engaged in human rights violations, cultural genocide, and environmental violations through its corporate policies
and conduct at the Grasberg Mine, located in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.” Alomang v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., No. 96-CA-2139, 1996 WL 601431, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996).
The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
rejected the defendant’s attempt to consolidate the action with Beanal, and remanded
the action to state court. See id. at *9-*10.
57. See supra note 3.
58. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see Eileen Rice,
Doe v. Unocal Corporation: Corporate Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1998).
59. Plaintiffs alleged that in building offshore drilling stations to extract natural
gas, the defendants, through SLORC military, intelligence, and police forces, used violence and intimidation to relocate entire villages, enslave armies living in areas where
the pipeline was to be installed, and stole farmers’ property. Plaintiffs’ claimed they
had “suffer[ed] death of family members, assault, rape and other torture, forced labor,
and the loss of their homes and property.” Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883.
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Regime in plundering the assets of the victims, concealed assets on deposit prior to 1945, and knowingly participated in
maintaining profits from slave labor under the auspices of the
Nazi Regime.60 The case settled in late 1998 for $1.2 billion,
and notice and distribution of the settlement proceeds to the
class members continues today.61 The class settlement in the
Swiss bank cases involves worldwide notice to over 900,000
claimants making up subclasses of victims including Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, gypsies, homosexuals, and the disabled.
Now new classes of plaintiffs have filed suits alleging they
were targets of Nazi persecution and were forced by corporate
defendants to perform slave labor during the Holocaust.62
Other classes have filed similar actions, alleging that German
60. See Memorandum of Law Submitted by Burt Neuborne, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997) [hereinafter Neuborne Memorandum]; Letter from Cohen, Milstein Hausfeld & Toll to Potential Class Members of
Holocaust-Related Litigation (Apr. 20, 1999) (on file with author). The Swiss banks
were described by plaintiffs as the “principle means of the liquidation, disposal and
conversion of that wealth into currencies usable by Nazi Germany to purchase its necessary war materials and conduct its extermination of the Jews.” Id. Banks allegedly
knowingly acted as receivers of looted property obtained in commission of “war crimes”
and therefore permitted the final consummation of the plunder, knowing that it would
be converted into foreign currency to buy war materials. See Transcript of Civil Cause
for Oral Arguments, In re Holocaust Victims Assets CV-96-4849, CV-96-5161, CV-97461 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 1997).
61. See Settlement Agreement at 9, 13-14, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No.
CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999).
62. For recent cases filed by Holocaust plaintiffs, see supra notes 2, 3. An estimated 8 to 10 million people worked as slave laborers in German factories of which approximately 700,000 are still alive. See John Authers et al., Unsettled Business, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1998, at 14; German Ex-Slave Workers Plan Action, AP
ONLINE, Nov. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22415808; Ian Traynor, Schroder Tries to
Hammer Out Settlement for Slave Labourers, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 23, 1998,
at 19 (describing a campaign to sue German and Austrian firms that benefitted from
slave labor during the Second World War, including: Siemens, BMW, Volkswagen,
Daimler-Benz, MAN, and Phillip Holzmann, as well as two Austrian groups—Voest
and Steyr-Daimler-Puch). It is estimated that the number of firms against whom allegations have been or will be filed may reach 100. See Class Action Complaint and Jury
Demand at ¶ 35, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 4, 1998)
(class action on behalf of all persons who were compelled to perform forced labor in inhuman conditions for Ford Werke A.G. between 1941-1945); Companies and The Holocaust: Industrial Actions, ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1998, at 75. Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of all economic benefits that accrued to the defendants as a consequence of
plaintiffs’ forced labor and compensation for the reasonable value of plaintiffs’ services
and damages for inhuman conditions. Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶
38-41, Iwanowa, No. 98-CV-959. Factual allegations include collaboration with the Nazis in safeguarding profits for Ford Company and supporting military operations with
trucks; cf. Class Action Complaint, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98-5499 (E.D.N.Y filed
Aug. 30, 1999).
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banks, including Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, accepted
their stolen money and property, handed over their assets to
the Nazis, and financed the building of concentration camps
and companies that employed slave labor.63 Individual Germans, including Siemens, Krupp, Henkel, Degussa, and Volkswagen, have also been individually targeted for allegedly employing slave labor during the Nazi Regime.64 Separate class
actions have also been filed against Austrian and French
banks, alleging that they accepted stolen assets from, and gave
Jews’ and others’ assets to, the Nazis.65 In addition, class action
suits have been filed against foreign insurance companies. For
example, one class action alleges that Assicurazioni Generali
refused to pay on life insurance policies owned by victims of the
Holocaust.66
This metamorphosis of the class action into a human rights
law enforcement mechanism requires courts to examine Rule
23 on a deeper level.
C. Certifying Human Rights Classes under Rule 23(a)
Human rights plaintiffs sue corporate defendants as a
class pursuant to the class action joinder device, which device
is not available in other domestic courts.67 The class action is
an anomalous procedural mechanism that treats a large group
of persons as a single unit for the purpose of litigation.68 The
63. See Simon Wiesenthal Ctr. v. Deutsche Bank AG, BC-302420, (S.F. Sup. Ct.
filed Mar. 31, 1999).
64. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
65. Settlements are currently pending with the French banks. See Frederic Bichon, French Banks Craft Accord on Jewish Assets, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 24,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2569848.
66. See Notice of Removal of Action, Friedman v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.,
No. 98-5780, (C.D. Cal. filed July 17, 1998).
67. See Detlev F.Vagts, Restitution for Historic Wrongs, the American Courts and
International Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 232, 234 (1998) (“The American class action finds
no counterpart in other countries and the mass judgments that result from the current
actions will be seen as crude solutions to complex problems.”); see also Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry,
6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217, 280 (1992) (distinguishing the class action experiences
in other countries “in which a public body or collective association activates the process
and does not fully assert the rights of all members of the injured class as by ‘fluid recovery’ ”); John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 521-24 (1994) (distinguishing class action models of joinder and consolidation in Canada, Australia, England, Switzerland, France, Germany, Belgium, and Greece, as not having binding
effects on all parties).
68. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 8.
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modern class action suit is a result of the creation of Rule 23 in
the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.69
Rule 23(a) permits the joinder of parties as a class if: 1) the
parties are too numerous to be joined individually (numerosity); 2) common questions of law or fact exist within the class
(commonality); 3) the class representatives have claims typical
of the class (typicality); and 4) the class representatives adequately represent the class’s interests (adequacy of representation).70 In addition to satisfying the above criteria, a class action must fall into one of the three categories defined in
subsection (b) of Rule 23. Subsection (b) sets forth the type of
class remedy most appropriate given the defendants’ resources,
the class’s allegations of harm, and the plaintiffs’ requests for
relief.71
1. Numerosity
The numerosity requirement is usually satisfied when there
are a large number of injured parties.72 In both Kadic and Marcos, for example, tens of thousands of alleged victims were
joined as a class because they claimed to have been targeted by
a common defendant on a massive scale.73 Similarly, in actions
brought against foreign corporate activity, large numbers of
plaintiffs alleged similar wide-spread harm.74 The alleged harm

69. The drafters of the revised rule indicated that they had recast “in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23
(amended 1966) (West 1992).
70. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 1-2 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (West 1992)).
71. The first type of action defined in Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is a mass-production version of Rule 19, the necessary-parties rule. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
allows for certification where there is a limited fund from which to compensate plaintiffs, and an individual member’s recovery may preclude recovery for other members.
See id. The bulk of the cases involves, and most of the controversy surrounds, the remaining two classifications. Rule 23(b)(2), which has accounted for the largest number
of class actions, applies to situations in which primarily injunctive or declaratory relief
is sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) is available if the case neither satisfies
23(b)(1) nor (b)(2) and the court, after determining whether the common interests of
the members predominate over individual interests, concludes that “a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The (b)(3) category is available to a class seeking
money damages. See id.; YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 246-47. The types of remedies
most appropriate for a class of human rights plaintiffs will be discussed further in Part
III.
72. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
73. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
74. See Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 20, Snopczyk v. Volks-
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often has an economic as well as physical element, such as
when an entire indigenous group is displaced or prevented
from enjoying the profits of the land due to environmental
damage,75 or an ethnic group is forced to work in corporate factories in subhuman conditions and denied profits or wages from
the work.76 Accordingly, the numerosity requirement should be
satisfied in an action where the plaintiffs assert human rights
abuses against a common defendant.
2. Commonality
In order to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a), there must be a definable group alleging a campaign or
policy of human rights abuses.77 Classes of human rights plaintiffs share a common status as members of an ethnic minority
group that has been the target of the alleged harm.78 Their
status as group members at the time of the harm is a common
question of fact to all members of the class. Frequently, members of ethnic minorities bear two or more defining characteristics.79 Objectively, the group at issue must constitute a “nonwagen A.G., No. 99-CV-0472 (E.D. Wis. filed May 5, 1999) (alleging 350-400 children
perished at defendant’s kinderheim); Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 1,
Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp A.G. Hoesch-Krupp, No. 98-DV-4280 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 11,
1998); Class Action and Complaint at ¶ 1, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959
(D.N.J. filed Mar. 4, 1998) (alleging thousands were compelled to perform slave labor).
75. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La. 1997)
(the plaintiffs alleged that the corporation’s practices “have resulted in environmental
destruction with human costs to the indigenous people,” but the court held that the allegations did not state an actionable environmental tort).
76. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 9-10, 21, Hirsch, No. 98-CV-4280; Complaint at ¶¶ 12, 8, 10, 12, Iwanowa, No. 98-CV-959; Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 53-55, 69; Complaint, Pollack
v. Siemens AG, No. 98-CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y filed Aug. 30, 1999).
77. Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 65. The Marcos litigation was the “first class
action to view human rights abuses in effect as mass torts, in which the plaintiffs establish that they are victims of a single orchestrated and illegal policy.” Id. at 68.
Steinhardt identified problems with human rights class actions and advocated the
creation of an “international convention for the redress of human rights violations.” Id.
at 69.
78. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 987-88 (1996). The book addresses minority groups that are typically ethnic,
racial, religious, linguistic, or national origin in character. “Ethnic” is used as a shorthand reference to all such minorities, whatever their distinctive characteristic. The
“term embraces groups as diverse as Muslims of North African background in France,
blacks and Jews in the United States, Gypsies in Hungary, Kurds in Iraq or Turkey,
[and] Russians in Georgia.” Id.
79. “No authoritative instrument . . . imposes a definition” of “minorities” within
the discourse of international law, and to some degree it is politically disputed. Id. at
988.
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dominant minority of the population . . . and its members must
share distinctive characteristics such as race, religion or language. . . . Subjectively, members of this group must . . . evidence a sense of belonging to the group, and evidence the desire
to continue as a distinctive group.” 80
The commonality requirement may be satisfied by a number of common questions of law or fact. Claims of international
human rights abuses present a common question of law under
the jurisdictional elements of the ATCA, the primary basis for
subject matter jurisdiction for human rights abuses.81 The
ATCA requires a court to identify a CIL norm and determine
whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pled a “tort,” or violation of
the identifiable human right norm. This determination is a
question of law that is common to the human rights class.82
Federal courts must wrestle with whether the alleged corporate
conduct implicates, and ultimately violates, a CIL norm.83 In
Karadzic, for example, the common questions included whether
the defendant violated CIL by instructing the troops to rape,
murder, and abuse and whether he acted with intent to destroy
an ethnic or religious group, thereby committing genocide, a
clear violation of human rights law.84
Whether the corporation, as a private actor, is bound by the
CIL norm is another common question of law.85 Human rights

80. See id.
81. See Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 3-5.
82. The court must determine whether there is an applicable norm of international law, whether it is recognized by the U.S., what its status is, and whether it has
been violated. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing In
re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500-502 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that official torture
is a jus cogens norm)).
83. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 335-38.
84. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
85. The legal issue of private actor liability for violation of international law has
been addressed. See Sanchez Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(dismissing plaintiffs’ claims of torture and rape against Nicaraguan Contras because
court was “aware of no treaty that purports to make the activities at issue unlawful
when conducted by private individuals. As for the law of nations—so called ‘CIL’. . . we
conclude that this also does not reach private, non-state conduct of this sort.”);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that the PLO, as a non-state actor and not recognized as a member of the community of nations, had, at most, committed obscure violations of international law for which the PLO could not be held liable). The application
of CIL to non-state actors has been discussed elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Justin Lu, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 531 (1997); Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 7-12.
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plaintiffs alleging that the ATCA has been violated by corporate defendants acting in concert with corrupt governments
also present common questions of fact regarding whether the
private actors’ conduct violates CIL.86 In Kadic, a common
question of fact was whether the defendant, the self-proclaimed
president of an unrecognized Bosnian-Serb entity, violated the
law of nations with respect to all plaintiffs by engaging in
genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary executions.87
The threshold requirement of commonality has been characterized as the “common sense approach that the class is
united by a common interest in determining whether a defendant’s course of conduct is in its broad outlines actionable.”88
Accordingly, where human rights plaintiffs allege that the defendant engaged in common course of conduct toward the
plaintiffs, the commonality requirement should be satisfied.
Moreover, slight differences in class members’ positions should
not defeat the commonality requirement.89
3. Typicality
The analysis of typicality overlaps with the commonality
analysis in that it goes directly to the existence of a common
question that makes combined litigation appropriate in the
first place.90 The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) inquires whether the named plaintiff is the right person to bring
suit on behalf of the class.91 The “class representative must . . .
86. See Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 32, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 4, 1998) (citing common questions, including
whether defendants compelled plaintiffs to perform forced labor; were unjustly enriched by their conduct; whether they violated law of nations; and whether Ford Motor
Company is liable for wrongful conduct of Ford Werke A.G.). Finding corporate defendants liable under the ATCA has expanded the reach of international law. See Ariadne
K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held Liabile Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927,
n.157 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (1987)
(“International law . . . deal[s] with the conduct of states and of international organizations . . . as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”)).
87. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
88. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. See In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1084 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating that plaintiffs must allege a “single disaster or single course of conduct” to
meet the commonality requirement) (quoting Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d
1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988)).
90. See General Tel. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
91. The underlying issue is what should be done if the plaintiff is not the right
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‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the
class members.”92 Accordingly, characteristics of the class representative are important. Differences in the nature of the
proof offered on the class claim and the representative’s individual claim may lead to a determination that the typicality
requirement is not met.93 Where the plaintiffs’ claims all arise
from the same course of alleged corporate conduct, such as acting with a state in the extermination of a collective people, the
typicality requirement should be satisfied, either directly or indirectly, by the demonstration of economic harm or slave labor.
Recent concerns of some courts that variations in state laws
and causation issues undercut the commonality and typicality
requirement do not apply to human rights classes.94 Variations
in state laws are not at issue in cases brought under the ATCA
for international “torts.”95 An additional concern is that there
may be several causes of harm in mass product liability cases
and, thus, typicality may not be present merely because the
plaintiffs allege a single source of harm. However, unlike typical mass product liability cases, though the degree and extent
of harm inflicted on human rights victims varies from person to
person, the proximate cause of all of the alleged harm is the
same: the defendant’s course of conduct, from Karadzic’s policy
of ethnic cleansing and the Swiss banks’ looting of Holocaust
assets to forced labor by World War II corporations and the destruction of indigenous cultures through joint venture pipeline
projects with foreign governments.
4. Adequacy of representation
Finally, before the judgment is binding on all members of

person. One answer is to allow the court and plaintiffs’ counsel to recruit a replacement. See Norman v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1972);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.16 (3d ed. 1995). The extent of that duty turns
on the stage the litigation has reached; courts are less likely to authorize such a recruiting effort at the class certification stage than in cases where, after they have certified a class, it appears that there is something wrong with the named class representative. See Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1982).
92. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156. The named representative personifies the class: she
“plays client” both before and after trial. See id.
93. See id. at 159 n.15; American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1082; In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1995).
94. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-43 (5th Cir. 1996);
American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1085; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300.
95. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 742-43; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300-01.
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the class, the court must determine that the class representative is “adequate.”96 This determination focuses on the “interests” of the class and serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.97
“The adequacy inquiry tends to merge with the commonality
and typicality criteria, which serve as guideposts” for determining whether the class action is economical and whether the
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are interrelated
enough for the “interests of the class members to be fairly and
adequately protected in their absence.”98 As in the commonality
and typicality inquiries, intraclass conflicts may cut against
finding there is adequate representation, although differences
in strategy or preferences, such as the selection of remedies,
will not defeat a finding of adequacy.99
The Kadic court found that the class representative was
adequate since class counsel was qualified and the class mem-

96. Since Hansberry v. Lee was decided in 1948, the issue of adequate representation has been elevated to a constitutional safeguard of due process (replacing individual opportunity to be heard). See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1940); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571
(1997). Courts continue to rely on Hansberry’s due process principle that, with limited
exceptions, one is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which he is not a party. See
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2301 (1999); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40. But
see Woolley, supra. In Rethinking, Professor Bone argues that the assumption that the
American system has always given litigants their personal day in court, absent compelling reasons not to, is wrong. Rather, the American system of adjudication has historically recognized classes of cases in which individuals did not have a strong claim to
participate. See Rethinking, supra note 19, at 206-31. Part IV will look more closely at
how this constitutional safeguard squares with collective claims of human rights
groups on a policy and theory level.
97. “[A] class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). Professor Yeazell argues that the distinct financial incentives driving (b)(2) and (b)(3) suits result in the two types having different social structures, which account for the different concepts of representation attached to (b)(2) and
(b)(3) classes. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 249-66. “Rule 23(b) suggests that interest
alone suffices to justify a class action brought under subsection (b)(2) but also requires
consent of the class members in an action brought under subsection (b)(3).” Id. at 252.
98. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13 (1982)).
“Typicality appears to be a means to the end of adequate representation, while adequate representation of interests appears to be the end itself.” YEAZELL, supra note 19,
at 251.
99. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 898-900
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing conflicts between past and present class members, where
those seeking injunctive relief instead of money damages did not overcome certification).
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bers collectively sought to establish the defendant’s liability.100
This rather loose inquiry into adequacy did not focus on intraclass conflicts, even though class members claimed distinct injuries, including forced impregnation, rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings.101 Commonly in human rights cases,
defendants engage in a policy or scheme of sequential violations that may affect individuals to different degrees, potentially leading to class conflicts over issues such as the appropriate remedy. For example, in class actions alleging human
rights violations related to environmental damage, subclassing
could satisfy the elements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy where some victims have not yet manifested full-blown
injury.102 Likewise, in cases such as the Holocaust litigation, in
which the defendant corporation may have targeted different
groups for different abuses, intraclass conflicts may be resolved
by dividing the group into subclasses that share like injuries.103
By finding that a human rights class satisfies the Rule
23(a) requirements, U.S. federal courts have recognized a defined class that may adjudicate as an entity and may be entitled to relief as well as bound by a final judgment.104 In human
rights litigation, the group will usually be defined by its common characteristic of ethnicity, religion, culture, or race, as
well as by the common harm suffered by that group vis-à-vis
the injury to members sharing in the common characteristic of
the group.105 To the extent that these classes seek to enforce
100. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
101. After Amchem, the required inquiry appears to be stricter. The Supreme
Court found that discrepancies among asbestos-related injuries would lead to inadequate representation where the currently injured and the exposed-only plaintiffs were
included in one class. See Leading Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 349, 353 (1997).
102. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-27; see infra notes 244-48 and accompanying
text.
103. See infra Part III.D.
104. Class definition also identifies those entitled to notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.14 (3d ed. 1995).
105. An example is Jews or Gypsies who claim systematic plundering of assets by
corporate defendants on account of their ethnic heritage or indigenous tribes claiming
harm to their culture caused by defendants’ environmental activities. See, e.g., Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. at 460 (defining class of Croat and Muslim citizens who allege they are
victims and/or survivors of victims of campaign of terror led by defendant). The
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, warns against using subjective criteria or criteria
that depends upon the merits, because “[s]uch definitions frustrate efforts to identify
class members, [and] contravene the policy against considering the merits of a claim in
deciding whether to certify a class.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.14 (3d ed.
1995) (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981)).
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the rights of a group, the class action is a powerful tool in the
evolution of collective rights.
II. CLASS PROCEDURE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Substantive Consequences of Class Procedure
This section discusses how the process of judicial certification of a human rights class shapes the substantive claims
brought by plaintiffs.106 The interplay of procedural rules and
substantive norms in the area of class actions has been accepted in different contexts but has not been analyzed in the
context of human rights law.107
Within the bounds of their rule-making authority, federal
courts may participate in the process of developing CIL norms
through the common law. Courts have significant rule-making
authority in procedural matters, which is generally shared
with the legislature.108 Among Article III’s proscriptions is the
106. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule
23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 860 (1995) (reasoning that “one need not read very far between the lines to find a substantive impulse underlying the federal courts’ handling of
mass tort litigation, and, in particular, class action innovations developed to cope with
it”).
107. The class action has been identified as the procedural cog in substantive tort
reform efforts. See id. at 870. Large class settlements implement an alternative to the
tort system that is responsive to the federal courts’ substantive concerns about mass
torts.
[T]hey 1) abolish punitive damages; 2) abolish or curtail claims for fear of future
harm; 3) substantially simplify issues of causation with regard to individual
claims; 4) adopt categorical compensation formats to even out amounts of compensatory payments; 5) provide for further compensation for actual worsening of conditions; and 6) cap or define the tort litigation costs for defendants.

Id. at 870. “Asbestos litigation has been the prime area in which federal judges have
used innovation to achieve essentially substantive goals.” Id at 862; see also Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1332 (5th Cir. 1985) (case filed, but not certified, as a class action).
108. See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (requiring that rules
of procedure “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”); see also Amchem
Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). Much has been written about the balance between judicial authority over “procedure” and legislative power over fashioning
rights, obligations, and remedies. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as
Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 951 n.108 (1998) (noting the scholarly
debate on the proper scope of rulemaking power vested in Supreme Court under the
REA). Scholars have noted the limits to rule-making, including the fact that rules cannot increase predictability but only serve to mask the exercise of discretion by decisionmakers. See id. at 948. Moreover, even if rules do confine discretion, such confinement may “serve to prevent just result by the over- or under-inclusiveness of the rules
themselves, by their inability to forecast the infinite variety of problems that will arise
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concept that the lawful function of judge-made procedural rules
is to facilitate deciding cases or controversies.109 Moreover, international law assumes that domestic courts may interpret
substantive norms with a “margin of appreciation,” taking into
consideration peculiar domestic circumstances, such as the use
of a class suit, without betraying the essence of the right in
question.110 As with class treatment of domestic claims, the
question is where a court’s authority to apply rules of procedure ends and the creation or modification of rights and remedies begins.111
The substance-procedure line is murky.112 Many purely proin their administration.” Id. at 946.
109. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
110. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Preamble refers to the rights it
guarantees as “common standard[s] of achievement,” which are to be striven towards
“by progressive measures.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Premable, U.N.
Doc. A/777 (Dec. 7, 1948). The International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights obliges States to recognize the rights in the Covenant “to the maximum of
its available resources.” International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GOAR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966). Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women allows for the use of essentially subjectively determined rules to protect and promote human rights by “appropriate” means. See The European Convention
on Human Rights, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Kinley, supra note 10, at 13-14; see also
HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996).
111. See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of
Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461 (1997).
112. See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281. Professors Hart and Wechsler have suggested that substantive, as opposed to procedural, rules of law are those “which characteristically and reasonably affect people’s conduct at the stage of primary private activity.” HENRY HART &
HERBERT WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953).
However, this definition does not encompass various rules such as statutes of limitations, laws of immunity, elements of damages, and burdens of proof. See John H. Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) (proposing that the
definition of “conduct” includes the “encouragement of actual activity, the fostering and
protection of certain states of mind—for example, the feeling of release”). Professor Ely
defined a procedural rule as a rule “designed to make the process of litigation a fair and
efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.” Id. The substantive right “is a right
granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.” Id. at 725; cf. Guy
Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 403 (1977). Over 20 years ago, Professor Hazard observed the synergy between substance and procedure and that “[t]he necessary technique is one of circumspect consideration of the appropriate role of the judicial
institution in shaping the substantive consequences of procedures such as those established in Rule 23.” Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the
Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973).
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cedural rules have substantive consequences.113 The substantive consequences of class action adjudication in modern U.S.
litigation are inescapable. Historically, the class action provided a vehicle for social change, aiding the plight of the oppressed.114 The influence of the class action has been most
prevalent in the areas of racial politics, consumerism, and environmentalism.115 Concerns about racial discrimination and
consumer and environmental injuries shared an affinity: victims asserted that “fundamental clogs in social processes would
prevent traditional procedural mechanisms involved in individual litigation from naturally righting these wrongs.”116 Each
plaintiff-initiated movement stressed the contrast between individual powerlessness and group strength, and each member
of the movement looked to the courts for help in gaining redress, turning to group litigation as a means of achieving that
redress.117
Federal courts clearly have the discretion to determine the
grounds for class treatment, the prerequisites of notice and
adequate representation, the limitations that should be imposed on the right to opt out, and the conditions under which
settlements should be approved.118 Each procedural inquiry
must take into account the substantive “interests” of the group
and, to a certain extent, the court’s determinations regarding
113. See Ely, supra note 112, at 700. Also, legal nihilists deny the line exists at all.
For a discussion of legal nihilism, see Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
114. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 1. Professor Yeazell locates the development
of adjudicative representation in efforts by courts and commentators since at least the
seventeenth century to assimilate “group litigation” defined as lawsuits on behalf of or
against numerous persons conceived of as a litigating entity. See id.; see also Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 19, at 218.
115. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 244-66 (describing the ways these three social
movements interacted with the doctrines of a new class-action rule.) Professor Bone
challenges Yeazell’s assertion that judicial concern with particular social groups and a
persistent tension between “consent-based” and “interest-based” theories of representation have been at the core of representative suit and class action law throughout the
modern period. See Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 19, at
218.
116. YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 244.
117. See id. at 240-43 (suggesting that if a lawsuit could achieve the same economies of scale as a manufacturer, it could counterbalance the manufacturer’s advantages). The class action has been described as a “mass production remedy” for “mass
production wrongs.” Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the
Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1973).
118. See generally, The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). Opt-out
rights are discussed infra, Part V.A.2.
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advancement of that substantive interest. For example, a finding that common questions of law and fact do not predominate
would effectively destroy (b)(3) treatment and the collective
remedies flowing from it. Similarly, requiring individualized
notice to all class members in (b)(2) actions may effectively
prevent plaintiffs from proceeding because of cost alone.119 A
finding that the representative does not meet the requirement
of adequate representation may also extinguish the substantive
rights of individuals who are unable to bring claims apart from
the class. While arguably a procedural device, the class action
must employ substantive compromises, such as theories relaxing the causation requirements found in simple litigation, in
order to be effectuated.120 Class actions have offered a theoretical model for solving some of the more intractable problems of
substantive tort law in mass tort litigation.121
B. Class Procedure and the Development of CIL
This section deals with the development of the legal aspects
of human rights, which is comprised of two basic elements: 1)
the legal expression, usually in the form of a legislative statement or judicial pronouncement; and 2) the backing of legal
sanction, or the means by which human rights are enforced.122
Accordingly, this section examines the evolution of human

119. Rule 23(b)(2) class actions do not require notice on the face of the rule, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); however, notice may be required by the judge’s discretion. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
120. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 561
(describing class action as deviation from the private law adjudicatory ideal).
121. In mass torts, “there may often be a total lack of proof as to whose product
affected which class member in the toxic tort case, and thus the most meaningful way
of addressing the issue of exposure is with respect to the class as a whole.” Shapiro,
supra note 108, at 930; see also Marcus, supra note 106, at 860, 873-74; Neuborne
Memorandum, supra note 60, at 19-21 (discussing Swiss bank market share theories);
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855-59 (1984) (proposing class action
treatment as method of solving problems of proving causation). Substantive theories
employed in class actions to deal with problems of proof are discussed infra Part III.C.
122. While the context here is the legal dimensions of human rights, it should be
noted that human rights also possess non-legal dimensions, expressed in moral or ethical terms and obligations. Kinley, supra note 10, at 4. Professor Kinley identifies five
features referred to as the “legal expression and enforcement continuum as it relates to
human rights: the formulation of human rights[,] the articulation and definition of
human rights[,] the implementation and application of human rights[,] the protection
and promotion [of] human rights[, and] the determination of breaches and provision of
means for obtaining redress.” Id. at 18-19.
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rights law toward collective rights adjudication, particularly in
the recent class actions claiming cultural genocide and indigenous spoliation.
Class treatment, as a judicial expression of human rights
norms, affects the alleged victims’ substantive rights under international law by giving clout to claims of collective or group
rights.123 Judicial recognition of collective private rights under
CIL, through class certification and implementation of class
remedies, enables individuals to exercise rights that, due to
costs, they would not otherwise enjoy.
Customary international law is expanding to protect previously unprotected rights.124 The evolutionary and amorphous
nature of the body of human rights law leaves the federal
courts wide latitude in influencing norm identification. Nontraditional economic and property rights, environmental rights,
as well as cultural and social rights of indigenous peoples are
involved in the new wave of class actions against corporate entities.125 In these cases, the judiciary’s voice in enunciating collective rights norms through class definitions (as well as fashioning groups remedies) is even more authoritative given that
the quest to define human rights in general has not resulted in
a settled understanding of universality of collective human
rights and leaves much territory to be charted by the court.126
123. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. 2d. § 4509
(1996).
124. For a discussion of the various rights now protected under CIL, see STEPHENS
& RATNER, supra note 31, at 79-94. The developing body of human rights law now includes condemnation of violence against women and recognition of gender violence as
violation of the laws of war, and willingness to recognize “domestic” violence as violation of international war. See id. at 88-89; see also Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New
Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984). “The
rights to self-determination of peoples; the individual right to leave and return to one’s
country; [and t]he principle of non-refoulment of refugees may be regarded as CIL
norms.” SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 339; see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GOAR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 32-38, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (due process rights). Several economic and social rights may be accepted as
general international law, such as the right to basic sustenance and public assistance
in health, welfare and basic education. ILO practice indicates that trade union rights,
including freedom of association are widely accepted. Women’s rights to full equality
and protection against discrimination are also recognized.
125. See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUS. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 82-85 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and
Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 (1996).
126. See generally Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 69-105 (Thomas
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The extent to which federal courts should participate in this
evolution is debatable, but the fact is that they are currently
participating by adjudicating human rights litigation.127
“In practice, civil and political rights have almost always
been given precedence at both international and domestic levels.”128 However, economic, social, and cultural rights have not
received such recognition.129 In modern international human
rights law, the concept of collective or group rights continues to
evolve. The collective rights of society or “peoples” has been described as the “third generation” of human rights, based on
“fraternity” and requiring new forms of international cooperation.130 This generation follows behind “the ‘first generation’ of
civil and political rights (based on the idea of ‘liberty’ and providing protection against state violations of the person), and
the ‘second generation’ of economic and social rights (based on
‘equality’ and guaranteeing positive access to essential social
and economic goods, services and opportunities).”131 The arguMeron ed., 1984); Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights,
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 201 (1998). The concept of universality of human rights “flows from
the notion that as a human being one is automatically entitled to respect for one’s dignity” and constitutes the basis upon which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was established in 1948. Kinley, supra note 10, at 4. Philosophical arguments justify
that such rights inhere in the natural condition of being human and that they are part
of a transcendental moral code that is necessary to maintain a base stratum of human
dignity. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977) (Kantian
theories); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198-230 (1980) (natural
law theories). However, claims to universality have been challenged by cultural relativists arguing that the potential existence of human rights is culturally dependent and
expressly contingent on relevant legal order. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al.,
Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 595, 625 (1991) (feminist
critique of universality, arguing that human rights impinge differently on women);
Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUM. RTS.
Q. 316 (1996). The Critical Legal Studies movement claims that a state’s provision for
legal mechanism by which rights may be asserted is contingent on maintenance of
whatever form of societal order that state takes. Rights operate as a means by which
truly radical political or social change is deflected and deflated. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1990). Finally, others advocate that the
notion of universality does not mean that human rights are timeless, unchanging, or
absolute; rather, any list or conception of human rights is historically specific and
contingent. See DONNELLY, supra note 10, at 1; Diane Otto, Rethinking the “Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997).
127. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
128. Kinley, supra note 10, at 9.
129. See Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 151-54 (Louis Henkin & John L. Hargrove eds., 1994);
see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 256-57.
130. DONNELLY, supra note 10, at 143.
131. Id.

BOYD-FIN.DOC

1139]

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

4/5/00 7:18 AM

1171

ment for collective human rights is problematic, in that human
rights are commonly understood to “derive from the inherent
dignity of the human person.”132 If human rights are based
solely upon one’s status as a human being, any rights which
arise from the solidarity of a community would not be human
rights.133 The notion of collective human rights therefore requires a radical redefinition of human rights.134
Currently, efforts to define collective human rights have
not resulted in any concrete norms. At the international level,
groups have exercised human rights based upon “international
and domestic guarantees ascribed to individuals against discrimination on group-distinctive grounds.”135 For instance, the
League of Nations attempted to incorporate into its system the
protection of racial and ethnic minorities.136 Early protection of
minority groups, differing in race, language, or religion, sought
to secure the right to peacefully coexist alongside the majority,
while at the same time preserving the minority groups’ distinct
characteristics.137
The development of collective rights, however, was hindered
by the belief that “observance by states of individually based
norms would solve the historical problems of oppression and
brutality that many minorities had confronted.”138 Based on
that belief, the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on
132. Id. at 143-44.
133. See id. at 144-45.
134. Cf. id. at 145, 147. Donnelly argues that collective rights should be “interpreted merely as the rights of individuals acting as members of social groups.” Id. For
example, the right of self-determination of peoples to determine their political status
and path of development can be seen as a collective expression of the right to political
participation. See id. Where people’s rights are presented as prerequisites for other
human rights, however, this concept is dangerous.
135. Kinley, supra note 10, at 10.
136. The Covenant of the League of Nations required “all new States to bind
themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous
States to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions
exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the
racial or national majority of their people.” Report of the Committee of Three (Japan,
Spain and UK) instituted by the Council of the League of Nations pursuant to its Resolution of March 7, 1929, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 73, at 42-64, 87 (1929),
reprinted in LOUIS SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 213-251 (1973) (describing the incorporation of treaties protecting minorities into the League of Nations Guarantee).
137. See generally Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1935 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 64, reprinted in SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136
at 213-23.
138. STEINER & ALSTON , supra note 78, at 187.
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Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights139 paid scant attention to minorities as such or,
subject to the major exception of self-determination clauses, to
collective rights.140 Since World War II, international decisions
have been inspired by a different philosophy—the idea of general and universal protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms rather than protection only for minorities in certain
countries.141 The human rights movements did not produce a
universal instrument dedicated to the problems and rights of
minority groups until the Declaration on Minorities was
adopted in 1992 by the General Assembly.142 Today, some specific group rights are commonly provided for in international
human rights instruments relating to cultural activities, minority languages, religious belief, and self-determination.143
Efforts have recently been directed toward developing additional and more detailed normative standards, with more effective and systematic procedures for implementing and enforcing
minorities’ rights.144 Along with the work of the international

139. Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: “In those
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language.” International Comment on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). “Article 27 is a limited provision. . . . [Q]uestions remain regarding . . . whether the right
to enjoy ‘culture’ extends to land and resource rights, and whether it effectively establishes rights for human groups as such.” Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State
Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 481, 490 (1992), reprinted in
PHILIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 498 (1996).
140. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 987.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. For example, Articles 19 through 24 in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, which covers rights to equality, self-determination, property, development, security, and a safe environment, refer to “all peoples” rather than “everyone” or
“all individuals,” and declares that the rights are exercisable “individually or collectively.” 21 I.L.M. 58, 62-63 (1982) The South African Bill of Rights protects the rights
to property of a “person or community.” S. AFR. CONST. § 25 (adopted May 8, 1996;
amended Oct. 11, 1996).
144. “A Working Group of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has,
after many years of slow progress, . . . draft[ed] [a] Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities for consideration
by the U.N. General Assembly.” Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 493. The General Assembly Resolution and Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities passed December 18, 1992. 32 I.L.M. 911
(1993). The General Assembly adopted the U.N. Declaration as a reaffirmation that a
basic aim of the U.N. is “to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for
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community, U.S. federal courts have the unique opportunity to
participate in the evolution of CIL toward collective rights
norms. Within the process of judicial expression and resolution
of class claims, the evolution of collective rights continues.
C. Collective Rights Adjudication and Norm Enunciation
The recent wave of class suits both evidences and contributes to the idea that fundamental human rights may not only
belong to individual persons but to classes as well.145 Apart
from recognition through international instruments, judicial
recognition of classes grants substantive power to groups to define themselves as rights holders. Human rights claims by nonstate groups are valid when articulated as claims by aggregates
of individuals who are seeking vindication of the same rights
enjoyed by other members of the local society.146 Groups, such
as indigenous tribes allegedly injured by environmental destruction or victims of certain nationalities or ethnic heritage,
such as gypsies or Jews injured by the Nazi Holocaust, collectively exercise participation “rights” as they seek group remedies.147 The judicial decision to define and certify the class of
human rights victims confers a type of “property” right to such
groups, in that they can aggregate their claims in order to

fundamental freedoms for all.” Id. at 913; see also G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Agenda Item 97(b) (1993); Geer, supra note 11, at 355-69. “The Council of Europe
is considering a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) in 1991 proposed that the Council of Europe adopt a European Convention for the Protection of
Minorities, implementation of which would be supervised by a European Committee for
the Protection of Minorities.” Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 501 (citing Declaration on
Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States § VII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1292, 1295 (1975)).
145. See Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights under the Alien Tort
Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 335, 337-45 (1997) (arguing that environmental human rights of
indigenous groups have been sufficiently developed to be used as a basis for suits under
ATCA).
146. “More difficult problems arise with this domain of discourse [of human rights
law] where the claim of the group is couched as something more than simply an aggregate of individual rights claims, or where the rights sought are not demonstrably identical with those enjoyed by the ambient population. In these and other situations . . .
the non-state groups . . . may find their claims are opposed by others on human rights
grounds.” Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 502. For example, equality rights “may . . .
provide grounds for upholding or for rejecting a particular group claim.” Id.
147. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 1.
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amass financial power.148 Class status enables dispersed and
politically unorganized individuals to present their claims as
an organization, thereby dispensing with the costs of creating
an organization.149
Plaintiff classes in the recent wave of human rights class
litigation have the procedural power to allege and possibly enforce norms on the outer boundaries of established human
rights. The term “norms” is used in this context in a “generic
sense to include a broad class of generalized prescriptive
statements— principles, standards, rules, and so on—both procedural and substantive.”150
1. Cultural genocide and the rights of indigenous peoples
Cultural genocide is defined as harm which is aimed at a
group’s cultural characteristics.151 Cultural genocide, or “ethnocide,” of indigenous peoples is described as “any action which
has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or their cultural values of ethnic identities; any
action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of
their lands, territories, or resources; any form of population
transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; or any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life” imposed upon them by
legislative initiative.152 The group is defined by the members’
participation in the tribe or indigenous culture.153 In such
claims, each member’s individual harm is subordinated to the
group harm suffered by the tribe. Common questions among
members as to the extent of the group harm fit well within the
parameters of Rule 23’s prerequisites for commonality and
typicality, based on the defendant’s common course of conduct.154
148. See id. at 6.
149. See id. at 248-49.
150. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 113. What brings both general and specific norms (for example, those codified in a treaty) “into a single generic category is
that they carry[] a sense of obligation.” Id.
151. See, e.g., Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (plaintiffs
alleging that defendant engaged in ethnic cleansing to rid the area of non-Serbs).
152. Geer, supra note 11, at 360.
153. See Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. at 460-61 (defining the class nationally, ethnically,
religiously, and by fact of rights violations.).
154. Common questions of law may be to what extent the defendant’s conduct
caused destruction of the group through the attack on cultural characteristics of the
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The concept of ethnocide presumes the existence of collective rights held by the group—rights to cultural values, ethnic
identities, lands, and resources. “Ethnocide” does not exist in
U.N. human rights instruments, although it may be understood
as being closely associated with genocide which is outlawed by
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.155 Genocide, the intentional destruction of a
group,156 is considered a human rights violation in CIL, upon
which plaintiffs may assert ATCA claims.157 While the prohibition of genocide is considered a universal norm for which nonstate actors may be liable, cultural genocide is more expansive
and problematic in the context of corporate liability158 because
plaintiffs must prove scienter.159 Given the existence of the corporate profit motive and the authorization of the corporate
conduct by local governments, cultural genocide may be difficult to prove, but it is not impossible.160 Corporate intent has
been proven by presumptions in other domestic contexts in fed-

class. See id. at 462.
155. In Article III of the Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide,
the following acts were considered as constituting the crime of ‘cultural’ genocide:
(1) Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in
schools . . . (2) Destroying, or preventing the use of, libraries, museums, schools,
historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects
of the group.

SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136, at 330-31 (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/794 (1948)).
During the debate of this article, “it was maintained that such acts would result in
losses to humanity in the form of ‘cultural contributions’, for which it was indebted to
the destroyed group.” SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136, at 330-31.
156. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, entered into force January 12, 1951, provides: “genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
157. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1996).
158. The court in Beanal looked to the Genocide Convention, Article 2(c) to determine if “cultural genocide” would raise the level of CIL and found that CIL did not include genocide of a culture but only the destruction of a group. See Beanal v. FreeportMcMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. La. 1997).
159. Interpretation of genocide involves analysis of intent. See Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see
also Beanal 969 F. Supp. at 373.
160. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 896 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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eral court jurisprudence.161 Borrowing from such precedent,
courts could fashion a body of law under which plaintiffs may
state a cause of action for cultural genocide against private
corporate defendants.162
The notion of “cultural rights” is closely tied with collective
rights of peoples. “Cultural rights refer to a community’s ‘way
of life,’ but not those aspects of the way of life regulated by
other classes of human rights.”163 In a sense, “cultural rights”
are a residual, but essential, category because “a community’s
distinctive way of life typically possesses an important value,
at least for its members, and we do see participation in ‘culture’
as essential to a life of dignity.”164
“Cultural land rights” of indigenous peoples also encompass
collective ownership between tribal peoples and the living ecosystem of their habitat and are the “primary basis of cultural
identification.”165 The international community recognizes that
indigenous and tribal peoples have the right to exercise control
over their destiny and provide the process of development, as it
affects their lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, and
the lands they occupy or otherwise use.166
The recognition of group rights in international law stems
from the notion that some human rights, such as the right to
self-determination, can only be exercised collectively.167 The
161. Scienter has been proven by inferring intent based on evidence that a corporation aided and abetted a primary wrongdoer. It requires showing the existence of “(1)
an independent wrongful act; (2) knowledge by the aider and abettor [corporation] of
the wrongful act; and (3) substantial assistance [by the corporation] in effecting that
wrongful act.” ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.10.3, n.20 (1986) (citing Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement under 10(b)(5)).
162. The Beanal case is currently pending appeal in the Fifth Circuit.
163. DONNELLY, supra note 10, at 155.
164. Id.; see also SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136, at 330 (describing the
development of notion of culture: “[w]hereas race is strictly a question of heredity, culture is essentially one of tradition in the broadest sense”).
165. Geer, supra note 11, at 349-50.
166. See Lee Swepston, The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No.
169): Eight Years After Adoption, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 24-25
(Cynthia P. Cohen ed., 1998); see also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (signed June 13, 1992) (clarifying that rights exist whenever
lands have been traditionally occupied and setting forth, in articles 7 and 14, that
rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they
traditionally occupy shall be recognized); Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14/Rev. 1 (U.N. Pub. E.73, II.A.14) (1973).
167. If a right is to be claimed—that of preserving one’s language and culture—it
will have to be attributed to the community. See Charles Taylor, Human Rights: The
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class structure provides the mechanism to enforce such rights
collectively and may be the only mechanism by which group
rights may be enforced.168
Plaintiff classes in recent cases have included indigenous
groups who have been injured by mining and oil exploration.169
In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, for example, the plaintiff, a
leader of an Indonesian tribe, brought suit on behalf of his tribe
against a subsidiary of Freeport, a U.S. corporation that operates copper, gold, and silver mines in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.170
The complaint alleged violations of international environmental law171 and, in particular, claimed that Freeport’s abusive environmental practices resulted in the “demise of the culture of the indigenous tribal people,” in other words, “cultural
genocide.”172 Though cultural genocide has not traditionally
been recognized as a human rights violation under CIL, the
Beanal court did not dispute that evidence of environmental
harm could be used to establish cultural genocide.173
Legal Culture in UNESCO, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 49
(1986), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 173-76 (1996) (describing
Romanticism’s influence on the view of man as a “cultural being who develops his humanity through a language” and knowledge that is expressed in a culture); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 49 U.N. Doc A/6316
(1967) (“All peoples have the right to self-determination.”).
168. See Rymn J. Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces,
“Greenkeeping,” and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection
During Armed Conflict, 454 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (1998) (contrasting
civil remedies with the adjudicatory responsibilities of international tribunals).
169. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (oil exploration);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated sub nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
170. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 362 (district court dismissed complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after agreeing that the ATCA creates a cause
of action for violations of international law). Beanal was not considered a class claim
because plaintiff failed to file for certification within the 90-day requisite time period.
See id. at 367. The court in dicta indicated that Beanal had alleged insufficient facts to
meet the adequacy of representation requirement. See id. at 368.
171. The complaint alleged, “[T]he mine itself has hollowed several mountains, rerouted rivers, stripped forest and increased toxic and non-toxic materials and metals in
the river system.” Id. at 382. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted claims for violations of
accepted human rights norms, including violations by security personnel at Freeport’s
mines. See id. at 368-69. The plaintiffs asserted additional human rights claims based
upon the environmental damages caused by the defendants. See id. at 382-84. Nongenocide human rights violations required state action, and Beanal failed to allege
state action. See id. at 371.
172. Id. at 372.
173. In dicta, the court criticizes the plaintiffs for not connecting their facts with
elements of the offense. See id. at 373. The plaintiffs in Aguinda, 850 F. Supp. at 282,
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The international community is increasingly recognizing
the special status of indigenous peoples in international law.174
The second section of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples affirms the right of indigenous peoples to
life and existence and, in particular, condemns policies of ethnocide.175 However, there are as yet no generally accepted definitions of “indigenous peoples” or even “minority” in the international community.176 Indigenous populations have been
disproportionately oppressed and victimized; their “habitats,
both culturally and geographically, have tended to be far re-

and Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 880, did not allege violations of international human
rights norms related to indigenous groups or other collective rights probably due to the
lack of precedent in ATCA litigation for claims of cultural genocide or violations of
group rights. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 372. However, the facts indicate that such
claims could have been pled.
174. Indigenous peoples number over 300,000,000—roughly five percent of the
world’s total population. See Geer, supra note 11, at 346. For an overview of the U.N.’s
work in the area of indigenous peoples, see Jose P. Kastrup, The Internationalization of
Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 97, 103 (1997); see also JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (1991); Russell L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s:
From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (1994) (discussing developments in international law recognition of indigenous peoples’ identity);
Markus Schmidt, Book Review, Coming to Grips with Indigenous Rights, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 341 (1997).
175. The U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Article 27
provides that Indigenous peoples have the right to restitution of the lands, territories
and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and
which have been confiscated, occupied, used, or damaged without their free and informed consent. See U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, Annex 1.
176. Geer, supra note 11, at 346 n.50 (citing Preliminary Report on the Study of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 26th
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.566 (1972)). Professor Geer adopts a working definition developed by a U.N. study on indigenous populations:
Indigenous community, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present nondominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of
their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.

Id. at 346-47 (citing Jose R. Martiniz Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations, at 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N.
Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1987)).
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moved from the ‘corridors of power.’ ”177 Therefore, where
classes of indigenous peoples are defined as a litigative entity,
power is granted to groups where little or none has existed.178
By allowing a tribe or other group bound by common ethnic and
cultural characteristics to enforce these cultural rights to group
existence, U.S. courts effectively expand international concepts
of collective rights violations.
2. The Holocaust cases and collective economic rights
Class action claims of other group rights, such as economic
and property rights brought by the plaintiffs representing victims of the Holocaust, also allow for the expansion of substantive human rights. In claims brought by survivors of the Holocaust, Swiss banks were accused of collaborating with the Nazi
government in looting and plundering property of the Jewish
victims, accepting the laundered assets, concealing profits
made from dormant accounts deposited by the victims, and
knowingly financing the Holocaust through loans to the Nazi
government.179
While economic rights have not traditionally been recognized as fundamental human rights,180 indigenous spoliation
may provide an actionable claim when brought in a class action
because the exercise of universally accepted fundamental human rights of individuals depends upon the continued existence of the group that is threatened by indigenous spoliation.181 Indigenous spoliation is defined as the destruction of a
177. Christian Bay, Human Rights on the Periphery: No Room in the Ark for the
Yanomani?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 124, 127 (Richard P. Claude
& Burns H. Weston eds., 1992) (explaining that wide-scale ramifications of destruction
of an indigenous people puts every individual’s survival at stake when ethnocide is in
progress by way of destroying the natural habitat or the religious faith or the needed
privacy of an indigenous people for the purpose of “development”).
178. See Geer, supra note 11, at 335-41.
179. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
181. However, alleging that “commercial” conduct rises to the level of a violation of
CIL for the purposes of ATCA is a difficult position. Plaintiffs pointed to the trial of two
bankers and industrialists for “commercial conduct” that aided the Nazis in committing
genocide and concealing profits. See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks
and International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 325, 413-14 (1998). The
only private banker tried under the Nuremberg Charter, Karl Rasche, Chairman of
Dresdner Bank, was tried and convicted at Nuremberg for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. See id. at 414-17; see also The Ministries Case, in XIV TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 621-22 (Rasche and Emil Puhl were tried jointly with 19 other defendants). The defendants in the Swiss bank cases argued that the sale of money or credit
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state’s endowment, the laying waste of the wealth and resources belonging by right to its citizens, or the denial of their
group heritage.182
Judicial recognition of class status for groups of Holocaust
survivors’ and families’ claims reinforces the concept that
groups possess certain collective economic interests, without
which the group’s right to exist is threatened. Jewish and
Gypsy victims seek relief for the demise of their heritage
caused by the defendant’s commercial conduct. In turn, their
common ethnicity provides the basis of procedural requirements because the representative plaintiff partakes in the
common characteristic of the group, which provides class status
and may provide the power to claim such collective harm.183
While merely alleging group harm does not automatically make
such harm a violation of CIL, without the class structure the
claims of systemic harm could not be brought at all.184 Indeed,
class claims of collective economic rights may allow for a more
accurate assessment of systemic harm done to the group and
actually provide remedies that better address the class-wideinjury.185
In sum, since the harm under the ATCA must be stated as

did not violate CIL, even where the financial institution knew that the recipient of
these services was utilizing the services as part of an ongoing war crime or crime
against humanity. See Defendants’ Reply Memo in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss the International Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim at 26, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 1997). The banks also argued
that the CIL norms in place in the 1930s or 1940s were not violated. It should be noted
that “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 11(2) U.N.
Doc. A/777 (1948); Walter J. Rockler, Prosecuting Bloodless War Crimes, 18 LITIG. VOL.
2, at 18-21, 59-60 (1992).
182. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ECONOMIC CRIMES 111-63 (1995) (characterizing indigenous spoliation as a breach of
international customary law of fiduciary relations); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide:
The International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
45, 56-61 (1995).
183. See Julia Collins, Stuart Eizenstat: Taking on the Unfinished Business of the
Twentieth Century, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 1999, at 18 (“The restoration of communal property is providing infrastructure for the reawakening of Jewish and Catholic
communities.”).
184. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. 969 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997)
(holding that without class certification, the named plaintiff had no standing to sue on
behalf of the group and also dismissing the claim of cultural genocide).
185. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 58789.

BOYD-FIN.DOC

1139]

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

4/5/00 7:18 AM

1181

a violation of CIL, courts have the unique opportunity to not
only “find” that the human rights norms evidenced by state
practice and opinio juris exist in a given case, but, in defining
the rights holders, also participate in the development of the
international society’s consciousness regarding group rights.
Thus, courts create opinio juris, the psychological component of
international law.186 When this component is added to the
evolving practice of states, the combination of psychological
and material elements arguably constitutes binding CIL.
As federal courts draw from CIL sources to define the validity of the class, one may question whether the collective rights
being defined and adjudicated are “new” human rights or simply rights that grow out of traditional human rights norms. In
any event, the dynamic nature of CIL allows domestic court
procedure, through the certification of class actions, to become
part of the transnational public law discourse through which
international human rights norms are developed. When domestic courts are willing to give litigative status to collective claims
of human rights, “utility, stasis, internalization, social pressure, moral compulsion, and fear of punishment,” the courts
may then contribute to the creation of new norms that carry a
sense of legal obligation.187 The interpretation, elaboration, application, and, ultimately, enforcement of international rules is
accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) interchange
among interested parties. The federal courts participate in that
process. The judicial interpretation of substantive human
rights of groups through the process of class definition is,
therefore, one aspect of the legal dimension of the developing
human rights law.188 Also present in class adjudication is the
granting of a class remedy to enforce such rights, thus giving
substantive teeth to the legal norm.
Class adjudication of human rights claims, both by recognition of the class status of claims holders and by the granting of
186. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 60 (1980) (arguing for the
“presentation” of norms).
187. “In contrast to other norms, legal norms have a relatively high degree of formality [and are] often authoritatively stated in formal instruments.” CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 5, at 114. “The production of legal norms is linked to the apparatus
of governments, and compliance often involves public coercive action,” and almost all
legal norms carry an obligation of obedience. Id. at 116; see FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL,
RULES, NORMS, AND DECISION: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 123-24 (1989).
188. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 118-23.
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relief to the group, expands the categories of international
norms being developed in U.S. courts.189 The next part will explore the class remedies available to persons whose human
rights are violated by corporate conduct.
III. COLLECTIVE REMEDIES FOR COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
A. The Role of Remedy
The legal status of human rights groups represented by a
plaintiff class depends upon the legal sanction granted to the
class.190 Enforcement of human rights has been the obsession of
proponents in the twentieth century; some have questioned the
existence of the rights altogether when there are no measures
for enforcing them.191 Indeed, it is well accepted in rights theory that where there is no remedy for a claim of right, the existence of the correlative right is tenuous at best.192 The imposition of obligations within a legal framework therefore gives
rights practical authority and places interests on a higher
plane of legal prescription.193 In a class action human rights
case, once it is determined that international law binds the private corporate actor to respect human rights, then the granting
of a remedy solidifies the corporation’s legal duty. Accordingly,
when a group remedy is enforced through the class action suit,
the group’s collective rights are grounded in a legal norm.194
Particularly where collective rights are being adjudicated,
viewing the remedy procedurally as a remedy for the group
seems more appropriate than viewing the remedy as addressing individual claims in the aggregate.195 Treating the class as

189. See, e.g, Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 362. In its analysis of the motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, the court wrestled with the question of whether an identifiable human right to a clean environment exists as CIL. See id. at 383-84.
190. See Kinley, supra note 10, at 3.
191. See generally Rutti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
301, 305-06 (1997).
192. See Kinley, supra note 10, at 15; see e.g., WESLEY N. HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-40, 56-60 (1964) (distinguishing between “true”
rights (which are rights as “claims”) and “privileges” (which are rights as interests or
goods or even demands, which may operate at level of persuasion in policy debates)).
193. See Kinley, supra note 10, at 8.
194. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 115-18 (defining legal norm).
195. The “entity model” views the entity as the litigant and the client and treats
the class action not as an aggregation of individuals but rather as an entity in itself for
the purposes of determining the nature of the lawsuit. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at
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an entity “does not deny the class member the opportunity to
seek private advice or to contribute in some way to progress,”
but it severely limits some aspects of individual autonomy, including the choice to move in or out of the class or be represented before the court by counsel of one’s own choice.196 This
“entity model” fits the human rights case in which the litigant
is a cohesive group possessing collective rights.197
B. Rule 23 Remedial Creativity
1. Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) remedies
Rule 23 allows a wide range of creativity for collective
remedies for entities.198 Mandatory class actions under 23(b)(1)
and (b)(2) best adhere to the entity model where the class as a
whole is the litigant. Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions are effective in assuring class recovery when plaintiffs are not adequately distinguishable from the class because the plaintiffs
and procedural posture of the claims are too similar to allow
opt out.199
Compensation through a mandatory (b)(1)(B) class is available where the class demonstrates that the fund available from
the defendant is insufficient to satisfy the aggregate of all
claims.200 The process of allocating compensation from a “lim918-19. In contrast, the aggregation model “sees the various joinder devices . . . as essentially techniques for allowing individuals to achieve the benefits of pooling resources against a common adversary . . . and the individual surrenders as little autonomy as possible.” Id. at 918. For example, the individual “retains his own counsel,
retains the right to leave the group before, during, and after the litigation, and can insist on playing a significant role in operations of the group” if he decides to remain. Id.
196. See id. at 919.
197. Croat Muslims, an indigenous tribe, or Jewish victims of the Holocaust are
examples of cohesive groups possessing collective rights. Given the opportunity, the
members of the group of human rights victims would usually choose to be treated as an
entity, with its consequent averaging devices such as class action adjudication, either
by settlement or through an opt-in procedure for class trial. See Rosenberg, Individual
Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 214-16 (pointing out that the concept of
individual justice embraces a rational-choice notion of self-determination, wherein an
individual confronting uncertainty prefers the process option that maximizes expected
personal utility from tort liability).
198. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 7B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1784, at 78-79, 86-88 (2d ed. 1985) (arguing that federal courts have
broad equitable power to devise novel remedial approaches in class actions).
199. See, e.g., Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424, 426 (holding class certified under
Rule 23(d)(5) grant of narrow discretionary power).
200. See id. 182 at 426-27.
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ited fund” must address any conflicting interests between
members and assure that the claimants identified by a common
theory of recovery are treated equitably among themselves.201
Where such cohesion exists, subordinating individual rights to
participate or opt out are justified.202 For example, in Doe v.
Karadzic, the court denied individual plaintiffs the right to opt
out of the (b)(1)(B) mandatory class on the ground that the potential withdrawal would jeopardize potential class recovery.203
Rule 23(b)(2) suits are most suitable for the enforcement of
public laws, including human rights law.204 When the alleged
human rights violations are widespread, the class action device
provides an effective remedy. The court will have the power to
monitor obviation of illegal conduct “in contrast to a mere declaration of abstract rights for an individual case, which is only
binding as to the specific plaintiff and has, at best, a limited
stare decisis effect.”205
Rule 23(b)(2)—indicating that it is “appropriate” to grant
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole where the party opposing the
class has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class—
underscores the idea that the legal system aspires to treat all
similarly situated persons alike.206 If an actor has treated a
group of persons unlawfully, it is appropriate that, if required

201. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2316-19 (1999); In re Asbestos
Litigation, 90 F.3d 963, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1996). Fibreboard was remanded by the Supreme Court in light of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See Fibreboard, 119 S. Ct. at 2295.
202. See infra Part V.A.2 for a discussion of opt out rights.
203. See Karadzic, 182 F.R.D at 424-28 (denying motion for interlocutory appeal
on issue of motion to opt out and stating that there is no due process right to opt out of
(b)(1)(B) class). The court also rejected the moving plaintiffs’ due process arguments.
See id.
204. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 249.
205. 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 25.25 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Newberg].
206. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 257; see also Doe I v. Unocal, No. CV 96-6959,
1999 WL 819698 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying class certification on the ground that plaintiffs had no Article III standing). In Unocal, the plaintiffs sought class-wide relief in
the form of a Rule 23(b)(2) injunction ordering the corporate defendants to cease payments to the military government and to cease their participation in the joint enterprise until the resulting human rights violations ceased. See id. at *6. The plaintiffs
also sought an injunction “preclud[ing] Unocal from selling its shares to a corporation
which [would] not waive any objections to th[e] court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
or prohibit the transfer of Unocal’s interest to any entity which [would] not agree to be
bound by the terms of the Court’s injunction.” Id. The plaintiffs also suggested “that
Unocal might be ordered to disgorge its profits from the pipeline.” Id.
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to mend his ways, he must mend them as to all.207 Where corporate defendants have caused harm to a group of similarly
situated persons—similar because of their common ethnicity or
minority status, location at the time of the abuses, or type of
harm suffered—then class injunctive relief is appropriate. In
considering (b)(2) certification of the human rights class action
against Unocal, the court found that the group of residents
from the Tenasserim region of Burma which made up the punitive class were so similarly situated because they sufficiently
showed that they were suffering the adverse effects of the alleged human rights abuses.208 The court also found that the
plaintiffs could be subject to a “credible threat” of future injury
due to the alleged ongoing human rights abuses caused by the
corporation.209 Particularly where the corporate defendant possesses the means to remedy the harm as to all the members, for
example, by environmental clean-up, the (b)(2) class structure
is well suited.210
The representatives of the proposed class must demonstrate
standing to seek the requested injunctive relief even prior to
the determination of Rule 23’s requirements.211 The district
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument in Unocal that they
automatically had standing to seek injunctive relief because
they had standing to pursue claims for damages.212 The class
representatives must demonstrate that a causal link exists between the group’s injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the
defendant.213 Moreover, the scope of the injunctive relief must
redress the group harm; where class-wide relief requires additional parties not within the court’s jurisdiction in order to redress the harm caused by the human rights violations, injunc207. YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 257; see also Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra
note 19, at 569 n.20 (stating that a (b)(2) class action may be used for structural relief,
such as a school or institutional reform suit). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflict
in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1188-91 (1982) (stating that although liability
issues may be common to the class in structural relief cases, there can be serious class
conflict at the remedy stage).
208. See Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 1999 WL 819698, at *4-*5.
209. Id. at *4.
210. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 282, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
211. See Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 1999 WL 819698, at *2. But see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2307 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 612 (1997) (holding it is appropriate to reach Rule 23 requirements first if they are
logically antecedent to Article III concerns).
212. See Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 1999 WL 819698, at *5.
213. See id. at *2.
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tive relief may not be appropriate.214 The (b)(2) class requires a
strongly homogenous unit, since the remedy is a single, unitary
injunction that directly benefits the class.215
Where plaintiffs seek recovery under CIL, the (b)(2) class
provides a procedural means for such a goal. For human rights
victims seeking relief as a group, finding a single “voice” is, at
times, more important than any monetary compensation.216
Few fora offer an institutionalized pronouncement of legal
norms as does the (b)(2) class remedy. Moreover, where the deterrence of harm by corporate defendants and corrective justice
for the victims provides greater benefit than the preservation of
individual rights to participate, which likely will not be exercised on a practical level, there is a strong case for collectivization of human rights claims.217 Particularly where the right to
individualized adjudication will not exist practically for victims, given the choice, the reasonable human rights plaintiff
would choose the aggregate claim treatment.218
2. Rule 23(b)(3) class remedies
Subsection (b)(3) classes provide for monetary relief and require heightened scrutiny of whether intraclass conflicts exits
between members’ interests.219 Homogeneity between interests
in the (b)(3) class is more difficult to achieve at the damage calculation stage; however, many innovative collective remedies,
such as fluid recovery, sampling, and averaging of damage
awards, have been applied to (b)(3) classes to, in effect, structure a group remedy to fit the group right being enforced.
Rule 23(b)(3) provides for class certification when the damages sought are primarily monetary and common questions of
law or fact predominate, as in the Holocaust survivors’ suits for
disgorgement of profits and compensation for slave labor.220
Where there are many victims seeking monetary compensation

214. See id. at *7 (finding that if an injunction were issued to enjoin Unocal, other
companies not parties to the suit would resume Unocal’s enjoined activities).
215. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 569 n.20.
216. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
217. See infra Part V.B.2. for discussion on deterrence.
218. Cf. Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 25253.
219. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (stating that the
predominance factor requires more than shared experience).
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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for human rights abuses in the past, such as in indigenous spoliation claims, a (b)(3) class may be the best procedural posture
for the class members.221
Again, as in (b)(2) classes, the calculation of damages becomes procedurally less difficult when the (b)(3) class is viewed
as an entity seeking a group remedy rather than individual relief. Where there are discrepancies between injuries to the individual members, the class structure provides sampling and
averaging. Courts are authorized to use creative methods for
calculating damages for the group when individualized consideration is impractical.222
Fluid recovery is one form of collective monetary relief that
may be used in human rights class actions. Fluid recovery distributes damages in class actions involving small individual
claims, where the small amounts at stake make it administratively impractical to distribute damages on an individual basis.223 Fluid recovery simplifies the class action by aggregating
damages suffered by a class in suits where “the [injured] individuals are unlikely to prove their claims individually or cannot be given notice.”224 Also, where there may be a surplus of
221. Rule 23(b)(3) classes are usually used where there has been a “mass tort in
which there are a large number of victims, all of whom have suffered, or are threatened
with, substantial injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct and who would be likely
(if the class action format did not exist) to bring individual actions seeking redress.”
Shapiro, supra note 108, at 926-27.
222. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.47 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that the
creations of funds and schedules of compensation are determined by aggregate procedures); see, e.g., Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp., 174 F.3d 203 (11th Cir. 1999) (disease
compensation program that provides compensation according to a specified schedule
operated by a Claims Administrator who may in turn hire claims officers); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV92-P-10000-S, CV-94-P-1158-S, MDL
No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (holding class certified as a 23(b)(3)
class); Breast Implant Settlement Agreement §§ III.C, VI.A, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-1158-S, MDL No. 926 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994).
223. See generally 2 NEWBERG, supra note 205, §§ 10.16-10.19; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 198, § 1784, at 82-85 (discussing fluid recovery); Stephen Berry, Ending Substance’s Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the
Class Damage Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299-302 (1980) (noting that small-claimant
class actions serve deterrence rather than compensation goals).
224. Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677,
721 n.265 (1999). The Supreme Court has not passed on the fluid recovery issue. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10 (1974). Congress on the other
hand has appeared to be sympathetic to fluid recovery in certain situations. See The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c-15d (providing
that state attorneys general may sue for “aggregate damages” sustained by citizens of
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money recovered, fluid recovery concepts would allow for the
creation of a fund earmarked to further agreed-upon goals of
the human rights litigation.225 Fluid recovery is consistent with
the objectives of human rights litigation—deterrence of corporate abuse,226 disgorgement of profits,227 and compensation.228
Sampling is another innovative method for apportioning
damages to human rights groups. Sampling applies statistical
distribution to a large population of similarly situated cases.229
The members of the class receive average outcomes, yet their
allegations raise issues that vary among group members.230 In
a sense, sampling bears some resemblance to the mandatory
class action under Rule 23(b)(1), in that both respond to a necessity for aggregate treatment. Rule 23(b)(1), however, seeks
to avoid the unfairness associated with certain types of remedial externalities, whereas sampling is designed to achieve judicial economy gains and facilitate lawsuits by reducing transaction and delay costs. 231 The use of a “special master” provides
another creative means for dealing with a group’s large damage
awards.232
their states based on “reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages”).
225. See CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 384 (West 1999) (providing that “unpaid residuals in
class action litigation are to be distributed, to the extent possible, . . . in a manner designed either to further the purposes of the underlying causes of action, or . . . to promote justice for all Californians”).
226. See infra, Part V.B.2.
227. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959, 1999 WL 719888 (D.N.J.
Sept. 14, 1999); Complaint, Pollack v. Seimens AG, No. 98-CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Aug. 30, 1999); Complaint, Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp. AG, No. 98-CV-4280 (D.N.J. filed
Sept. 11, 1998); Complaint, Gross v. Volkswagen, No. 98-CV-4104 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 31,
1998); Class Action Complaint, Burger-Fischer v. Deguss AG, No. 98-CV-3958 DRD
(D.N.J. filed Aug. 21, 1998); Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 60, at 3, 11-12.
228. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that the acceptability of fluid recovery must be determined on a case-by-case basis while holding that
it could not be applied on these facts).
229. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding the use of sampling to determine damages).
230. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 564, 605 (squaring sampling with rights-based theory).
231. Sampling was effectively used in the Marcos human rights litigation. See
generally Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.2d 767, 782-84 (9th Cir. 1996).
232. A special master has also been appointed in the Swiss Bank Settlement to
manage distribution of damages. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victims
Assets, No. CV 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999); Letter from Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, supra note 60 (Judah Gribetz has been appointed special master by the court in order to work out the fairest plan of allocation of settlement funds);
Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks to Notify Potential Recipients, JERUSALEM POST, May 27,
1999, at 5. Judah Gribetz has scheduled a “fairness hearing” for November 29, 1999, at
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While sampling and fluid recovery may have a skewed effect on damages because they imperfectly allocate the total
damage figure by distributing damages based upon averages,
these creative remedies realize effective deterrence goals.233
Sampling complements collective human rights claims234 and,
by treating substance and procedure as a single mechanism,
enforces the human rights that CIL is meant to advance.235
Sampling does not violate anyone’s rights if the outcomes it
produces are consistent with the moral theory that supports
the substantive law, such as corrective justice theories of tort
law, because it focuses on restoring the moral equilibrium that
existed between the corporate wrongdoer and the human rights
victim before the wrong occurred.236
C. Class Action Solutions for Problems of Proof
Problems of proof often prevent plaintiffs in international
human rights cases from obtaining relief. The class action
model provides solutions for problems of proof that may arise
in mass human rights cases.237 For example, without the class
action device, corporate activity designed to conceal evidence
may prevent adequate discovery for the framing of issues.238
which any survivors may comment on allocation of funds. Public forums will also be
held in Israel, the United States, Europe, South America, and Australia to solicit comments. See Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks Reparations Only Expected in One Year,
JERUSALEM POST, June 6, 1999, at 3.
233. See Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 596 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (recognizing the potential benefits of the aggregate damages approach); see also Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 572 (noting that the use of sampling can provide
small-claimant class actions with deterrent effect). But see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that such deterrence measures
may be too effective, forcing parties who may not be guilty to settle).
234. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the
advantages that sampling provides to plaintiffs and holding that sampling does not
violate due process).
235. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 605 (arguing that under
moral rights theory sampling does not interfere with litigants’ rights).
236. See id; infra Part V.B.1 (discussing corrective justice).
237. See Rosenberg, supra note 121, at 855-59, 890 (1984) (proposing class action
treatment as a method of solving problems of proving causation).
238. The Holocaust plaintiffs had difficulty framing claims against Swiss banks
who they claimed retained their family’s money for over 50 years, given the lack of
documentary evidence, the time-gap between the claims and events, and the actions of
the defendants in concealing assets over the years. See Ramasastry, supra note 181, at
350-51. Holocaust plaintiffs espoused two arguments: first, that defendants engaged in
“a conspiracy . . . to, at a minimum, deny, block, and/or obstruct access to, or knowledge
concerning, deposited and looted assets and profits derived from slave labor” and sec-
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Domestic theories used in mass product liability cases, such as
the “fraud on the market” theory, were employed by the Holocaust plaintiffs in the case against the Swiss banks. Using collective liability theories from domestic law, plaintiffs claimed
that the Swiss banks together owned 75-80% of market share,
based on the size of the banks.239 The plaintiffs also contended
that the level of specificity required in pleading was reduced by
this alternative liability theory.240 Plaintiffs argued that it was
too difficult to determine which Swiss Bank accepted, cloaked,
or looted assets, and that the “problems of proof related directly
to defendant banks’ actions since they ‘negligently failed to
maintain and/or purposefully concealed proofs which exist or
may have existed and affirmatively obstructed access to such
proofs.’ ”241 In litigating human rights class claims, other legal
presumptions could be used to avoid requiring individual proof
of causation where the defendant’s duplicitous conduct made it
difficult or impossible for alleged victims to discover the cause
or source of harm. So long as there is proof of defendant’s illegal activity and injury to the group, individual proof should not

ond, that the defendants are liable under “market share liability.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, Failure
to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can be Granted, Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages at 5, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No.
CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997).
239. See Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 380-81. Relying on New York law, the
plaintiffs argued (1) that problems unique to the case made it impracticable to prove
which defendant caused the injury; (2) that all defendants engaged in tortious conduct;
(3) that the problems of proof were related to the conduct itself; and (4) that there was
no other effective remedy. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1329
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Collective liability provides both a basis for establishing a defendant’s liability where proof of causation is impossible and a method of apportioning
damages between liable codefendants.”); Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 60.
240. Under New York law, “liability here is based upon chance, not upon the fair
assessment of the acts of defendants.” See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 513
(1989).
241. Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 380 (citation omitted). The defendants’ responded that collective liability merely eased plaintiffs’ burden of proof, but plaintiffs
must still produce evidence that each defendant was engaged in the alleged wrongdoing. See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Partial Motion to
Dismiss Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim at 15 n.45, In re Holocaust
Victims Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 1997). Also, “in order to seek disgorgement of assets due to unjust enrichment, plaintiffs must be able to trace assets
directly that relate to their injuries and connect their claims to individual defendant[s].” Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 380. However, the plaintiffs argued that the
banks’ commingling of assets made it impossible to extricate the identification of individual property that was looted and disposed of by the banks. See id.
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be required.242
As courts draw from domestic mass litigation to simplify
the adjudication of mass human rights torts, they create more
precedent for the expanded interpretations of CIL and collective rights adjudication.243 Even class actions that settle before
a full trial on the merits have the power to affect the substantive development of human rights law.
D. Settlement and Subclassing
The reality of mass tort litigation, including human rights
litigation, is that most cases will end in settlement. The Supreme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, however,
made it clear that courts, even in settlement classes, must determine whether all of Rule 23(a)’s requirements are met.244
Where class members have suffered different harm as a result
of the corporate defendant’s conduct, implicating the commonality and typicality requirements, the court may divide the
class into subclasses pursuant to 23(c)(4)(B).245 By dividing a
class, a judge may be able to redefine the responsibilities of
class attorneys and named plaintiffs in terms of the interests of
distinct and relatively unified portions of a class. For example,
in the Swiss Bank settlement, the plaintiffs’ class was divided
into five subclasses based upon the type of injury alleged: Deposited Assets Class, Looted Assets Class, Slave Labor Classes
I and II (divided into groups of victims of Nazi persecution who
actually performed slave labor and all other individuals who

242. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 904 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975). Similarly,
courts grapple with the propriety of generalized proof of impact in antitrust class actions, which are concerns not present in human rights litigation.
243. Such transformations of CIL principles have occurred in other human rights
litigation. For example, in Doe v. Unocal, the court determined that the Burmese plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim by alleging that Unocal participated in acts of
forced labor, which was enough like slave trading to constitute a violation of the law of
nations for ATCA jurisdiction. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
244. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-28 (1997) (finding
that no commonality or adequate representation existed among the class because the
claimants had different levels of exposure, different severities and types of diseases,
and came from states whose laws varied widely on several issues); Walker v. Liggett
Group, 175 F.R.D. 226, 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (denying class certification in light of
Amchem); Leading Case, supra note 101, at 350.
245. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 (emphasizing subclassing as means for dealing
with predominance problems).
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performed slave labor), and Refugee Class.246 The necessity for
ranking of class interests by the parties may therefore diminish
while the likelihood that diverse absentee interests will be presented to the court increases due to subclassing. Subclassing,
however, is possible only if different class members coalesce
into discrete, identifiable groups. Often, differences among
class members will not divide along clearly defined lines.247 The
litigation for each subclass is treated as a separate lawsuit, applying the same rules of class definition discussed above.248
Class action settlement in human rights litigation offers
unique opportunities for increased dialogue between international actors, including nongovernmental organizations and
public interest groups.249 Greater dialogue on compensation
schemes, terms of settlement for injunctive relief that involves
changes in corporate and government policies, and public acknowledgment of wrongs promote one of the key objectives of
the plaintiffs’ classes: to have broad statements of rights acknowledged on the international level. Moreover, it is currently

246. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No. CV 96-4849
(E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999). The refugee class consists of victims or targets of
Nazi persecution who sought entry into Switzerland to avoid Nazi persecution and who
actually, or allegedly, either denied entry into Switzerland or were deported, detained,
abused, or mistreated, after gaining entry. See Marilyn Henry, Victims of Omission,
JERUSALEM POST, July 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9006150. The refugee class also
includes the
individuals’ heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, who have or at any time
have asserted, assert, or may in the future seek to assert, claims against any
(Swiss bank, enterprise or institution) for relief of any kind whatsoever relating
to . . . the alleged denial of entry, deportation, detention, abuse, or other mistreatment.

Id. The defendant banks agreed to the inclusion of the refugee class as a condition of
the settlement at the insistence of the Swiss government, as the refugees made no
claims against the banks directly. See id.
247. See Developments in the Law – Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1479-82
(1976).
248. There must be a proper class representative for each subclass, and all other
requirements of Rule 23 must be satisfied. See Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency,
Ltd., 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981).
249. See Holocaust Payout Plan is Ready: Cash Next Year for Victims, Relatives,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 29, 1999, at A04; Netanyahu Holds Summit Over Share-Out
of Nazi-Era Assets, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 31, 1998, available in 1999 WL
16589428 (both articles mentioning involvement of public interest groups as part of
discussion over Swiss Bank settlement); see also Beth Gardiner, Survivors Upset Over
Swiss Bank Case, AP ONLINE, Aug. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22036918 (mentioning opinion of a party to the Swiss bank settlement regarding amounts of plaintiffs’
claims). The dialogue between the Swiss banks and the Swiss government resulted in
the inclusion of the Refugee class. See Henry, supra note 232.
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accepted that collective remedies may actually be a more accurate means for just compensation than many individual
cases.250 As discussed, current class action procedure offers
creative group remedies to address widespread harm to ethnic
minority groups, thereby giving teeth to evolving notions of collective human rights.
IV. CLASS PROCEDURE AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Achieving Compliance
Enforcement of human rights law has been problematic
from its inception.251 Large corporations, while global actors on
economic levels, are rarely accountable for transnational harm
to human rights.252 In fact, multinationals have operated in a
virtual legal and moral vacuum.253 Public international law has
failed “to address the post-World War II emergence of [multinationals] as a major international force.”254 Moreover, the narrow view of international law as relations between states allows large corporations to evade accountability at the domestic
level by shifting production between sites. The absence of in-

250. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 21516 (1996); Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815
(1992); see also Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 577 (“Professors Saks
and Blanck “argued that the average of sample case verdicts is likely to be more accurate than an individual trial verdict for many mass tort cases.” (citing Saks & Blanck,
supra)).
251. Victims can report to international and domestic governmental and nongovernmental organizations but cannot count on them to stop an ongoing violation,
punish the wrongdoer, or order compensation. See RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 8 (1991).
Regional human rights bodies are somewhat more effective than U.N. human rights
bodies. See id. at 591. The Inter-American Commission issues decisions that are only
recommendations. See id. at 592.
252. See Frey, supra note 12, at 153-54, 157 (1997) (constructing a continuum of
governmental, nongovernmental, private, transnational corporations to protect human
rights according to the corporation’s level of activity in the country).
253. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (1989)
(“[W]ith the exception of a handful of nation-states, multinationals are alone in possessing the size, technology, and economic reach necessary to influence human affairs
on a global basis.”).
254. Geer, supra note 11, at 335-37 (mapping the context for international legal
rights analysis and the role of multinational oil corporations in the ethnocide of indigenous groups in Amazonia).
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ternational standards increases corporations’ ability to avoid
responsibility.255 Multinationals are not legally accountable in
any system except their host country.256 Furthermore, the problem with such limited accountability is that the alleged violations often involve the collusion of corporate entities and governments.
Some human rights covenants do place limitations on individual or corporate actions when defining fundamental
rights.257 However, these covenants do not expressly hold corporations responsible for affirmatively protecting human rights
or taking steps to prevent others from violating those rights.
International legal liability, therefore, does not usually apply to
corporations but rather to the governments that regulate
them.258
Since the 1970s, there has been some increased pressure to
regulate the behavior of non-state actors in the realm of human
rights within the U.N. system, with the fairly recent push for
corporate codes of conduct.259 These codes originally sought to
“prevent interference with the internal politics of host coun255. See id.
256. See id; see also Sacharoff, supra note 86, at 927 (1998). Many host countries
have self-protection regulatory measures such as ownership restrictions for foreign investment. See Amy Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 289 & n.491,
290-91 (1995).
257. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Annex,
Art. 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948); Civil and Political Covenant, Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16 art. 5(1), U.N. Cov. A/6316 (1966).
258. See Frey, supra note 12, at 163. See generally FRANK C. NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 5-17 (2d ed.
1996) (stating that U.N. documents bind governments not non-state actors).
259. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 527, 528, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974) (recognizing the rights of the state to control the activities of transnational corporations acting within its borders and calling for a code of conduct that
would prevent economic exploitation of host countries); E.S.C. Res. 1913, U.N. ESCOR,
57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. 5570/Add. 1 (1975) (establishing the U.N.
Commission on transnational corporations comprised of members from 48 states to
formulate a code of conduct); E.S.C. Res. 1908, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at
13, U.N. Doc. E/5570 (1974); Development and International Economic Co-Operation:
Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990) (attempting to strike balance between competing interests of regulating corporate conduct
and setting standards for nondiscriminatory host government behavior towards corporations); see also Daniel B. Magraw, Introduction to United Nations ECOSOC Draft
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 533-38 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds.,
1990) (describing the history and purpose of the U.N. MNC Code of Conduct effort).
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tries and, to limiting [sic] the adverse effects of TNC [transnational corporations] activities on national economic objectives.”260 The economic and political conditions that gave rise to
the initial calls for a universal corporate code have changed because developing countries are now faced with an acute shortfall of investment.261 The new goal is to “reintegrate developing
countries into the global economy in a manner that ensures inflows of new investment capital.”262 Recently, the relationship
between multinationals and host countries has shifted. “TNCs
are no longer seen as suspicious intruders . . . but rather, as
welcome and wealthy guests.”263 Host countries are now more
open to inward foreign investment and the activities of transnational corporations.264 In 1993, the U.N. abandoned its fifteen-year effort to create a code of conduct for transnational
corporations.265 The history of the draft code represents growing compromise by those states advocating multinational control of their original objectives. Consequently, corporations
have enormous influence, both positive and negative, both in
home countries and abroad, without any international human
rights law that applies to them.266
Moreover, there have been few successful domestic legislative efforts to specifically regulate corporations on human

260. Frey, supra note 12, at 158, 165-67. See also SIDNEY DELL, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 24-26 (1990) (describing focus on regulating
restrictive business practices); id. at 73-74 (discussing environmental exploitation, antitrust issues, and truth in business dealings) ; MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1, at 457, 59394; Mark Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the Henhouse?, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 399, 411 (1992-93) (noting the purposes of private codes of conduct and assessing their usefulness).
261. See Frey, supra note 12, at 160 (“Due to world economic and ideological
shifts, there has been a retreat from the international control model that was in vogue
in the 1960s and 1970s regarding [transnational corporations]. States once critical of
[transnational corporations] now find themselves competing for the benefits of foreign
direct investment from multinational companies.”).
262. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1, at 596; see also Frey, supra note 12, at 158.
263. Frey, supra note 12, at 167.
264. In 1994, the Commission on Transnational Corporations became the Commission on the International Investment and Transnational Corporations. See id. at
167 n.75 (citing Transnational Corporations Report, U.N. Doc. TD/B/42(1)/4 (1995), at 4
(“Within today’s globalized world economy, characterized by increased interplay between investment, trade, technology and services, member States placed increased emphasis on the contribution that transnational corporations could make to growth and
development.”).
265. See Geer, supra note 11, at 353 n.74.
266. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1, at 8-10; Frey, supra note 12, at 159-60.
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rights issues.267 Economic sanctions have been sporadically
used as a tool to punish offending governments, which may directly impact corporations doing or seeking business in these
countries.268 Executive action seeking to encourage selfregulation by the corporations has also had limited success.269
Finally, self-regulation appears to occur only in response to
the pressure of legal sanctions.270 In the case of the Holocaust
class actions, companies such as Daimler-Chrysler, Deutsche
Bank, Siemens, Volkswagen, Hoesct, Dresdner Bank, Krupp,
Alliance BASF, Bauer, BMW, and Degussa have announced
plans to participate in a $1.3-1.7 billion government fund proposed by German Chancellor Schroeder and created to compensate Holocaust victims and their heirs. The fund is to be established on condition that the class suits against the companies
be dropped.271 Also, U.S. and European insurance commissioners finally created a $90 million fund to redress wrongs alleged
267. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 101 passim,
91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (barring American companies from bribing officials of foreign governments). The most comprehensive legislative response to human rights was the
Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 (Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
99-440, § 101 passim, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) (repealed 1993)), which contained a code of
conduct that required protection of human rights. Id. § 208, 100 Stat. 1097-98. Legislation introduced in 1995 by Senator Mitch McConnell proposed to ban U.S. investment
in, and trade with, Burma. The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, modeled after the
Anti-Apartheid Act, sought to prohibit investments that supported the abusive Burmese military governments. See, e.g., Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Child Labor,
Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J.
INT’L L. 663 (1997); Frey, supra note 12, at 169-73 (discussing the limited legislative
efforts to regulate multinationals on human rights issues and the executive initiatives
regarding the Model Business Principles). See generally 141 CONG. REC. § 211; see also
the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995, § 706, 104th Cong. (1995) (prohibiting the importation of goods produced abroad with labor of children under fifteen years old).
268. See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1995) (regulating economic sanctions against North Korea and other countries in the areas of
sales, purchases, specifically designated nationals, sending gifts); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 101 passim, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (requiring
the President to commence diplomatic efforts with U.S. allies to establish multilateral
trade sanctions); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
22 U.S.C. § 6032 (1994) (urging the President to apply sanctions against countries assisting Cuba); Frey, supra note 12, at 168-69.
269. Self-regulation was proposed by the Clinton Administration in the form of
Model Business Principles. See Frey, supra note 12, at 158-59, 171-73; Baker, supra
note 260.
270. See Geer, supra note 11, at 353 n.74. See generally Matthew Lippman, Multinational Corporations and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 392-401 (Richard Claude & Burns H. Weston eds.,
1992); Sacharoff, supra note 86, at 935-37.
271. See Letter from Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, supra note 60.
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by the class action plaintiffs, such as refusing to pay premiums
of policyholders in concentration camps and “requiring nonexistent death certificates of the murdered policyholders.”272
Therefore, because the enforcement of human rights has
been problematic, class action suits offer a means for deterring
corporate activity harming large groups of victims.
B. Forum Access for the Human Rights Class
1. Sovereignty and enforcement of international human rights
law in domestic forums
Enforcement of human rights law against corporations has
been difficult in part due to notions of sovereignty which constrain the application of domestic law extraterritorially. Thus,
victims of human rights abuses often lack access to courts.273
To preserve world order, courts and governments must cooperate to create legal systems that protect both international
human rights and transnational capitalist interests.274 Specifically, as a participant in the international community, the
United States is obligated to provide remedies for victims of international atrocities.275 The rule of law cannot be achieved
without access to the courts. The principle that mandates that
civil claims be capable of submission to a judge “ranks as one of
the universally ‘recognised’ fundamental principles of law; the

272. Collins, supra note 183, at 18. See also Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. 98-CV-09186 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 30, 1998); Drucker Cornell v. Assicurazioni, No. 97-CV-02262 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 31, 1997).
273. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
274. The alternative would be primitive systems of self-help and sanctions often
through mercenaries (gangs or illicit mobs, illegal drug cartels, and global conspiracies
run by enterprises) to enforce bargains and social norms through private customs and
informal codes. Cf. Christenson, supra note 5.
275. The right to a remedy contained in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirms that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the constitution or by law.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see Jordan Paust, Draft Brief
Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity
for Violations of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49 (1985); Vienna Convention on International Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, in 8
I.L.M. 679 (imposing obligation on signatory states “to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”); cf. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 153 (3d ed. 1993) (international law imposes obligations
on nations, but does not regulate how nations treat these obligations).
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same is true of the principle of international law which forbids
the denial of justice.”276
When providing remedies for victims of human rights
abuses, compliance with international norms is achieved
through the internalization, or incorporation, of CIL into domestic law. When domestic courts adjudicate international
class action claims, their judicial interpretation and application
of substantive human rights norms reinforce CIL principles at
the international level.277
The evolution of CIL raises concerns of whether this internationalization of domestic law undermines the executive sovereignty and whether a judicially internationalized law of nations threatens the normative structure within which the
interaction among sovereigns takes place.278 However, courts
have traditionally supplemented—not replaced—executive action through transnational litigation for the protection of
transnational corporations.279 Private enterprises demand that
courts and administrative agencies safeguard investment and
provide reasonable regularity in transnational business dealings and risk.280 U.S. federal courts have internalized international law to affirmatively support transnational production
and exchange based upon free markets, trade, and investment
whenever the political branches or common law give the slightest grounds for incorporating these expectations as federal
law.281 To hold, then, that the protection of universal human
rights is beyond the purview of judicial power without political
direction—either affirmatively by public entitlements or nega-

276. Golfer v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 34-35 (1975), reprinted in R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 563, 570-71 (1979).
277. See Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 46.
278. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 67.
279. See id. at 74-83; see also Koh, supra note 41, at 24-25, 39, 43, 54, 60; Edward
M. Morgan, Act of Blindness, State of Insight, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 22-23, 32 (1995).
280. See Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y, 405, 427, 429-30 (1997).
281. For example, merchant law, maritime law, and prize law from the law of nations is incorporated as rules of decision. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (dealing with pre-trial discovery); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (involving refugee status); Steinhardt, supra
note 4, at 11 (citing Chan v. Korean Airlines, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989)) (stating that private parties routinely use domestic courts to enforce international rules governing investment, trade, civil aviation, pre-trial discovery, banking, commercial transactions,
and refugee status). See generally Christenson, supra note 280.
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tively by restraining abuses of public and private power—is
misguided.
2. Internalizing international human rights law creates
precedent
On the flip side of internalizing international law into domestic law is the transporting of domestic precedent from
ATCA jurisprudence to other domestic and international
fora.282 In class adjudication of human rights, U.S. courts participate in CIL enforcement through judicial pronouncement of
norms and enforcement of class remedies.283 U.S. courts have
traditionally been reluctant to extend domestic law extraterritorially unless a U.S. interest was directly involved; however,
the rapid rise of international trade and investment and the
appearance of multinationals is weakening adherence to this
principle.284 The extension of universal CIL, on the other hand,
should be less problematic as CIL is, by definition, accepted by
states, as evidenced by their practices and their psychological
acquiescence.285 Therefore, sovereignty concerns diminish when
applying CIL to foreign conduct.286 The judicial expression of
CIL principles concerning collective rights is then available as
precedent in international and other domestic fora.287

282. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Parts II & III.
284. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (“Acts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects
within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [a defendant] had
been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its
power.”).
285. See supra INTRODUCTION.
286. See Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and
“ET”, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1024-34 (1989).
287. In recent decisions, the International Tribunal and the House of Lords have
cited domestic law as precedent. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1324 (H.L., Nov.
25, 1998) (United Kingdom House of Lords: Regina v. Bartle and the Commission of
Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, citing Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (1980) as precedent that torture has jus cogens status in international
law); UK High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, In re Pinochet Ugarte, 38
I.L.M. 68, 84 (Oct. 28, 1998) (citing Marcos and Filàrtiga as precedent); Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 36
I.L.M. 908, 945, 946, 953 (May 7, 1997) (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995) (liability for non-state actors), R. v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. 701, 222 n.167 (1994) (Canadian case regarding requisite mental element for crime against humanity), and Quinn
v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1986) (grouping war crimes with crimes
against humanity).
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In essence, the federal courts, in applying their domestic
class procedures to international human rights claims, not only
internalize international human rights norms into domestic
law but also participate in a dialogue with international institutions by establishing precedent for international human
rights norms.288 Given the dearth of federal choice of law rules
for transnational litigation,289 courts may now create an ad hoc
mixture of situs law for determining the definition of tortious
conduct under CIL and compensatory damages.290 In addition,
the possibility that a federal court adjudicating a transnational
case may find that remedies such as punitive damages are
available under international law provides parties suing under
CIL a remedy unavailable to foreign plaintiffs suing under
other theories.291 Transnational choice of law rules applied in
U.S. federal courts may allow punitive damages, subjecting
“deep-pocket” corporate defendants to U.S.-style discovery of
their financial worth, which would be unavailable in other international fora.292 Plaintiffs can then arguably demand such
discovery be available to enforce their international rights in a
non-U.S. forum.
Beyond expanded remedies, the nature of transnational
plaintiffs’ rights under international law is expanded.293 Foreign plaintiffs should be able to draw upon this newly developed body of law to enforce their rights in other fora. Such a
dialogue is key to global corporate actors’ compliance and the
enforcement of international human rights.

288. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2353-54, 2371, 2374.
289. Cf. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991).
290. Id. at 3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(3)
& (4) & cmt. H (1987).
291. In the absence of a federal statute, the law governing choice of law is state
law. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 6 (1971). See also Christenson, supra note
280, at 446, 515; Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 93-96 (stating that rules of decision may
defer to place in which alleged abuse occurred, international law for determining jurisdiction under § 1350 and punitive damages and the forum law for procedural issues
such as abatement).
292. Cf. Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of Foreign Privilege in United States
Discovery Proceedings, 9 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 80, 92-93, 136 (noting the lesser discovery privileges available in international tribunals).
293. See supra Part II.
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V. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE
In domestic civil procedure, many commentators have argued in favor of collectivized class treatment of mass tort
claims, while others have posited that class treatment threatens individual autonomy and the concept of each individual’s
right to a “day in court.”294 In the human rights context, similar
arguments may be made.295 However, when viewed in light of
human rights policies, the criticism of class procedure is neither theoretically nor practically justified.
A. Autonomy Versus Collective Justice
Class actions have been problematic since the Advisory
Committee’s admonition that mass tort actions were largely
unsuitable for class treatment.296 Some problems have arisen
because class actions are an exception to the deeply ingrained
rule that a person is bound by judicial proceedings only if he or
she is a party.297 Inherent in the prolific discourse surrounding

294. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 923; see also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS (5th ed. 1994). In other mass tort contexts, courts have recently exercised caution with the class action, perhaps in reaction to more aggressive attempts to aggregate
cases under Rule 23 and the lack of careful analysis of its requirements; courts have
refused to certify broad classes or have overturned certification by district courts. In
denying class certification, courts have reiterated the potential for prejudice inherent
in class certification. See, e.g., In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-79
(6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1304 (7th Cir.
1995); Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 475-76 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 555 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d, 84 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 1996). Futures classes and the issues they present have been the subject of substantial judicial attention. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617
(3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624
(1997); In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom., Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). “Judges and scholars have assessed and debated questions such as how to ensure that absent class” members are adequately represented, especially when those members are truly passive as with a futures class.
Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comity, Consent, and Collusion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (Jan. 1999). See also id. at 413 n.2.
295. Indeed, the only analysis of class treatment of mass human rights claims
warned that class treatment may threaten the autonomy of individual litigant victims
suing under the ATCA. See Steinhardt, supra note 4.
296. Murphy, supra note 294, at 413 n.1; see Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1148, 1149 (1998) (“Class actions occupy an uneasy place in American jurisprudence.”); see, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1183 (8th Cir. 1982);
Mertens v. Abbott Lab., 99 F.R.D. 38, 40 (D.N.H. 1983).
297. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (describing general “ ‘deep-

BOYD-FIN.DOC

4/5/00 7:18 AM

1202 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
class actions is the debate between the advocates of individual
autonomy in litigation and the proponents of collective justice.298 The modern class action challenges ideas of individual
autonomy by allowing a representative of the group to make
decisions affecting the group’s rights and remedies.299
1. Collective justice
Advocates of the class action as a means toward collective
justice reason that the aggregation of claims through the class
action is the most efficient way of promoting individual justice.300 Heeding efficiency considerations in class treatment results in better substantive outcomes for class members than if
they were to litigate in a series of individual actions.301 These
advocates argue in favor of collectivized treatment based on
economies of scale such as pooling of resources and information
and reduced counsel costs. In addition to saving resources, the
distributional equities that “flow from a system that allocates
compensation to victims on the basis of expected average harm,
as compared to the vastly greater expense and ‘luck of the
draw’ that play a role in the outcome in each of a series of indi-

rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court’ ”) (quoting
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417
(1981)); see also YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 12-13; Monaghan, supra note 296, at 1149.
298. The topic and controversy of class actions is significantly in the forefront of
legal and academic discourse. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 913 n.2 (listing the more
important legal works on the subject of class actions).
299. The modern class action is an exception to the individualistic tradition of Anglo-American law, political theory, and philosophy. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 2.
The apparent undermining of individual autonomy inherent in Anglo-American legal
tradition spurred controversy around the class action among the general public and
within the legal profession. See id. at 8-9. See also Rosenberg, Individual Justice and
Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 212 (“Criticism of collectivized resolution of mass-tort
cases proceeds from the standard universalist conception of individual justice that
holds sway in civil procedure discourse.”); Mass Torts Problems & Proposals, in REPORT
ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 3, App. C, Feb. 15, 1999 (containing the report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief Justice of the United States and to the Judicial Conference of the United States).
300. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 916 n.4; Rosenberg, Individual Justice and
Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 210-16. But see JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995).
301. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19;
Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 563-73; Rosenberg, Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 236-52; Shapiro, supra note 108, at
928.
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vidual adjudications,” weigh in favor of collective treatment.302
Moreover, it is arguable that the “day in court” ideal does not
actually give participants control over litigation as a practical
matter.303
Collective justice arguments may also be made in favor of
class treatment of human rights claims. Given the difficulty of
litigating CIL claims under the ATCA, in which alien plaintiffs
sue multinational or foreign defendants for offenses that occurred abroad, the costs of most human rights cases are exorbitant, and aggregate treatment is, therefore, justified.304 Most
plaintiffs who have been victimized by mass human rights violations lack the financial or political capability to initiate individual adjudication and would choose aggregate recovery over
none at all.305 Also, given the political and economic power of
corporate defendants, the aggregation of claims and the possibility of collective remedies in class actions may be the only
hope to deter mass human rights violations.306
2. Preserving autonomy
While I have suggested that in collective rights claims remedial procedures should address the class as an entity, traditional class action mechanisms, such as notice, opt out, and individual trials on damages or common questions of liability, in
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are still available.307 For instance, where
discrepancies in the types and levels of injuries among human
rights victims308 undermine class cohesion and make the pre-

302. Shapiro, supra note 108, at 928.
303. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 58283, n.86 (“[T]here is no reality to the notion that claimants have significant personal
influence or involvement, let alone control regarding the course of litigation and settlement, other than wielding some degree of ultimate veto power over the settlement
price.”).
304. Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on United States Group Actions, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 833, 836 (1997).
305. See supra Part II.B.
306. See infra Part V.B.2. (on deterrence goals); supra Part III (on collective remedies).
307. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV 96-4849,
(E.D.N.Y. Settlement, Jan. 26, 1999). The class was given option of timely request to
opt out. The Settlement specified that the court had discretion to request members to
describe the nature and amount of any claims that the member may wish to assert in
the future.
308. For example, often victims do not manifest injuries from exposure to environmental contamination at the same time other victims do. See Leading Case, supra
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dominance requirement difficult to meet, such as when some
class members have not yet manifest injuries from exposure to
environmental contamination,309 individual trials may be conducted in the country where the majority of plaintiffs reside.310
Rule 23’s built-in procedural safeguards address and satisfy
autonomy concerns. For example, inherent in the class procedure to safeguard individual autonomy is the representation
requirement, which grows out of the assumption that every individual has a right to strategic choice in all cases.311 This requirement ensures that a court will inquire into the interests of
the individual class members.
Under Hansberry v. Lee, the determination of whether the
named plaintiff represents the interests of the class is actually
an inquiry into individually expressed desires to enforce
rights.312 Where the class interests are collective in nature,
each plaintiff’s claim is based upon harm done to the group, so
individual interests are uniform. Therefore, the representation
inquiry ensures that class members’ interests are represented.313 Thus, where intraclass conflicts are minimal due to
claims under CIL being based upon harm done to the group,
the representative plaintiff (so long as they belonged to the
group at the time of the harm) will be adequate to safeguard
the interests of each member.
In addition, the notice requirement helps preserve individual autonomy in class cases. Notice to the Rule 23(b)(3) class
allows unnamed plaintiffs to: 1) monitor performance of class
representatives and class counsel; 2) object to a proposed settlement in 23(e) settlement cases; and 3) enter appearance
through counsel. Also, notice enables class members to opt out
note 101, at 354.
309. See id.
310. Paul A. Volcker, Dormant Accounts in Swiss Banks: The Independent Committee of Eminent Persons, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 515-17 (1998).
311. This assumption has been questioned by scholars advocating the collectivization of claims and broader preclusion rules. See supra Parts III.A & III.B.1; Bone, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 198-200, 236-37 (noting that some commentators equate
participation with representation); Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN L. REV. 655, 678-79 (1980).
312. Ironically, the consent requirement is present only in (b)(3) actions in which
interests are less socially ambiguous than in mandatory class action suits that do not
require individual consent. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 255-61.
313. Moreover, subclassing under Rule 23(c)(4), wherein a representative is assigned for each subclass, will ensure that the interests are uniform among members
and adequately represented by the named plaintiff.
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of the class and pursue individual remedies.314 Adequate notice
may be accomplished even if some class members cannot be
identified.315 Courts have fashioned elaborate notice schemes
that meet constitutional requirements,316 even for class members outside the U.S.317 Such schemes are being used in current
human rights litigation and effectively preserve procedural
rights of the human rights plaintiffs.318 In the Swiss Bank settlement, the court mandated that notice be sent to dozens of
countries and in various languages by mail and in newspaper
advertisements to nearly 900,000 potential beneficiaries of the
$1.2 billion settlement. Approximately $25 million will be
taken from the settlement proceeds to cover notice costs, thus
raising policy concerns that such elaborate notice schemes are
counter-productive.319
While notice attempts to preserve the participatory rights
of the individual members of a (b)(3) class, the logic behind the
notice requirement has been questioned by scholars and, indeed, its efficacy in human rights classes may be doubted.320
Particularly when the collective rights of the group as an entity
are being adjudicated, the case for strict adherence to notice
seems less compelling.321 The “right” to notice in human rights
cases should be reexamined in light of the real costs and benefits involved. Arguments for viewing the class as a litigant may
call for more selective notice so long as an adequately represen-

314. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
315. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317
(1950); Vancouver Women’s Health Collective Soc’y v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d 1359,
1364 (4th Cir. 1987) (approving publication as a procedure by which A.H. Robins would
give worldwide notice of its bankruptcy proceedings); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. 618, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that in bankruptcy proceedings, notice
by publication is constitutionally adequate “to those beneficiaries whose interests are
either conjectural or future”).
316. See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-13 (1985).
317. The notice scheme in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor included hundreds of
thousands of individual notices, a wide-ranging television and print campaign, and
significant additional efforts by 35 international and national unions to notify their
members. 521 U.S. 591, 640 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 1987) (notice by media).
318. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV 96-4849
(E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999).
319. See Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks to Notify Potential Recipients, JERUSALEM
POST, May 27, 1999, at 5.
320. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 247-48.
321. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 936.
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tative group is notified.322 “[V]iewing the class as the sole litigating party does not undermine the value of requiring individual notice to all those who can be identified with reasonable
effort, so long as the cost is not so high as to sound the death
knell of the action.”323 In addition, costs will likely be a problem
for human rights plaintiffs because generally poverty or disenfranchisement lie at the heart of their claims, and many classes
of human rights victims rely on public interest counsel.324 Accordingly, in these cases, there is a strong argument that
where the probabilities of plaintiffs’ success are great, the defendant should be directed to pay costs of notice.325
The opt out provision can also protect individual autonomy
in class actions. Rule 23(c)(4) mandates that (b)(3) class members be given the opportunity to opt out if they wish to pursue
individual claims or to forgo claims altogether.326 For collective
rights adjudication of human rights claims, a limited opportunity to opt out may be more appropriate than traditional opt
out rights. When a class seeks both monetary and injunctive
relief or in cases where the substantive law mandates, a class
would be treated as a (b)(2) rather than a (b)(3) class.327 The
concerns of class adjudication that may form the basis of a

322. See id.
323. Id; see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 162 (1974).
324. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1991) (noting the costs of notice to named plaintiffs).
325. The Supreme Court has rejected this approach. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 156.
But see Shapiro, supra note 108, at 936 n.59.
326. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), appeared to constitutionalize this requirement. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 937-38 (discussing the need for
reconsideration of opt out rights). In early class action jurisprudence, adequacy of representation was all that was needed to satisfy due process requirements; notice to the
class and opportunity to opt out were not required. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
44-46 (1940); see also Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 362 (1921).
327. See Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (involving plaintiffs who moved to opt out of (b)(1)(B) action under 23(d)(5) grant of narrow discretionary powers; however, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that withdrawal
would jeopardize the potential class recovery and the moving plaintiffs were not adequately distinguishable from the class). There have also been attempts to opt out of the
Swiss Bank Settlement by named plaintiffs in the class, based upon a disagreement
with the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded. These attempts to opt out illustrate the
possible harmful effects of unlimited opt out rights. See Beth Gardiner, Survivors Upset
Over Swiss Bank Case, AP ONLINE, Aug. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22036918; cf.
Holocaust Suit Parties Withdraw, THE RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Aug. 24, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 7111633.
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class member’s desire to opt out could be addressed through
other means, such as caps on attorneys’ fees or punitive damages.328 Encouragement to remain in the class may be accomplished by a variety of creative means, such as providing that
limited individual claims may go forward in fora with concurrent jurisdiction, so long as the class recovery amount is offset
by any individual recovery amounts.329
To the extent that human rights plaintiffs’ classes are
treated as an entity with substantive rights founded in CIL
principles of collective rights, opting out would undermine such
interests and therefore may not be warranted, so long as it is
not constitutionally mandated.330 In general, procedures such
as opt out and notice designed to preserve individual autonomy
are less compelling in the adjudication of collective human
rights where shared interests are a prerequisite to the collective rights claims. Moreover, when balanced with considerations of corporate deterrence of human rights abuses through
group remedies, a policy toward disallowing opt out rights is
justified.
Given the difficulties in obtaining individual justice at the
international level, class procedures do not compromise victims’
individual rights to participate. Unlike domestic litigation,
rights to participate in the international judicial process are
not widely acknowledged, likely due to the lack of civil redress
328. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 594
(advocating opt out for noncommon issues); Shapiro, supra note 108, at 938 (calling for
conditional or limited opt out rights). For an in-depth discussion of the numerous ethical considerations for attorneys representing classes, including the issue of attorneys’
fees, see generally, Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994).
329. In the Swiss Bank Settlement, for example, the settlement agreement incorporated provisions allowing plaintiffs to pursue claims with the Independent Claims
Resolution Foundation, chaired by Paul A. Volcker, which was established to oversee a
streamlined process for resolving claim to dormant accounts, so long as the claims tribunal recovery was offset in the settlement recovery. See Swiss Bank Settlement at
Art. 4, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26,
1999). Such provisions would obviously cut down on plaintiffs opting-out of the class
because they wished to pursue claims before the international tribunal.
330. The court in Karadzic dismissed the plaintiffs’ due process arguments. See
Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. at 428-29; see also Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 1999
WL 6360, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999) (motion for interlocutory appeal on issue of
motion to opt-out denied on ground that there is no due process right to opt out of
(b)(1)(B) class); Shapiro, supra note 108, at 954-55 (suggesting that the opt-out rule is
not constitutionally mandated, and if the entity model is validated by substantive law,
the author suggests that the substantive interests of the class would be undermined if
individual members could opt out at will).
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for individuals at the international level.331 The class model,
however, presents a limited way for groups or associations to
bring legal claims in international fora.332 Non-state groups
face additional obstacles because procedural rules are usually
not well-developed. These procedural limitations are a result of
the historically interstate character of the international legal
system. More effective procedural norms are beginning to appear, due in part to the increasing transnationalization of the
international legal system.333 However, “international bodies
remain cautious when handling major claims by nonstate
groups” partly because they “seek to maintain a universalist
view of their practice,” thus avoiding setting precedent which
may be inapplicable later due to political consequences.334 U.S.
courts should be less wary of their precedent being binding internationally and more concerned about being one voice in the
dialogue between international bodies.335
B. Human Rights Objectives and Class Adjudication
Collective adjudication of human rights claims is a means of
implementing human rights objectives, promoting corrective
justice for groups of victims through compensation for harm,
and increasing compliance with norms by deterring violative
corporate behavior.
1. Corrective justice
Classic rights-based theories underlying the domestic tort
system and international human rights law may further justify
331. However, there are some opportunities for individuals to petition specific international tribunals. For example, Art. 25(1) of the ECHR refers to competence of persons, groups of individuals, and non-governmental organizations to lodge petitions alleging violation of Convention-protected rights. European Convention on Human
Rights, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 25(1).
332. The European Commission on Human Rights has accepted petitions from
trade unions and private associations as well as corporations. See TOM ZWART, THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS 46-47 (1994). The right to an individual
petition under Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is a right only for
individuals. The Human Rights Committee has declared group petitions inadmissible.
See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communications Nos. 360/1989 and
361/1989, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 307-10, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
333. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(DISCUSSION DRAFT) (1999).
334. See Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 518.
335. United States judicial precedent may be instructive to international bodies.
See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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class actions for enforcement of human rights plaintiffs’ claims
against corporations.336 Theories of corrective justice are based
upon the axioms that “the value of individual entitlements to
personal security should be protected against . . . wrongful or
nonconsensual invasions . . . and that [human rights] victims
should be made whole.”337 Both the tort system and the system
of human rights law secure personal rights, including compensating victims after-the-fact and “policing the behavior of
would-be violators to prevent wrongful infliction of incompensable losses.”338 Collective adjudication protects personal security of the groups at issue by developing and enforcing universal norms regarding group rights.339 Civil litigation by
groups of human rights victims engages courts in a moral dialogue, which contributes to more effective reasoning about international human rights.340
Practically speaking, without the opportunity to be represented in a class action in U.S. courts, the members of a human
rights class will be unable to seek redress for violations of collective or individual rights.341 Rights-based theories, holding
that the dignity of individuals should be protected by the judicial process, could therefore also apply to human rights
classes.342 Rights-based theories assume that by not guarantee336. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 567,
579-86 (discussing rights-based theories justifying class treatment).
337. Id. at 580.
338. Id. at 581.
339. Outcome-based participation theories hold that participation of the individual members of the class is good only to the extent that it facilitates sound public norm
creation. Bone, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 201; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term– Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1978).
340. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2374. “Outcome-oriented theory evaluates participation for what it adds to the quality of the outcome,” most conventionally, “the final
judgment, consisting of the legal remedy and the determination of legal and factual
issues.” Bone, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 201 (examining process-oriented (sometimes called intrinsic) and outcome-oriented theories of participation (sometimes called
instrumental) and arguing that the extent of a nonparty’s right to relitigate claims or
issues should vary with type of case).
341. See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One’s Rights – Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1170-77 (discussing the
use of litigation access fees and noting that the civility of our law rests on its recognition of individual entitlements and responsibilities).
342. See JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177-80
(1985) (discussing the dignitary process theory and arguing that direct participation
has intrinsic value in promoting individual dignity); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (“[G]rant[ing] to the individuals or groups
against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in the processes
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ing each litigant a day in court individual dignity is compromised.343 At the heart of rights theory is the concept of “moral
harm”—“the special injustice someone suffers when one of her
rights is wrongly denied”; this type of harm will inevitably occur when there is no forum at all for the adjudication of victims’ rights violated by international corporate activity.344
In international law, the inherent good of participation in
the creation of legal norms through the political process is the
“possibility of self-realization through development of the social
self.”345 Where ethnic or minority groups seek to enforce international human rights in the collective, the self-realization and
dignity of the individual members as participators in the judicial process is at stake only to the extent that the group’s interests are enforced.346 Accordingly, class adjudication, where the
class interests are reinforced through deterrence mechanisms
such as class injunctive and compensatory remedies, enhances,
rather than compromises, the inherent dignity of individual
absentee members of the class.
2. Deterrence
Utilitarian theories also justify class treatment in actions
against large corporations engaged in risky behavior by creating optimal incentives for firms to take due care. Such incentives may deter corporate joint ventures with corrupt governments in mass victimization of plaintiffs’ rights under CIL.
Deterrence, in the view of some, remains the primary justi-

by which those decisions are made . . . expresses their dignity as persons.”); Frank I.
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS
XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126-27 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1977)
(“They attach value to the individual’s being told why the agent is treating him unfavorably and to his having a part in the decision.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary
Process; A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV.
433, 439-43 (1987) (advocating natural rights approach to due process based on liberal
democratic values).
343. Rights-based adjudication theory “perhaps . . . assumes that, by not guaranteeing litigant autonomy” individual dignity is compromised. Bone, Rethinking, supra
note 19, at 256-57.
344. See id. at 260.
345. See Henry Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM.
RTS. Y.B. 77, 105 (1988). International human rights law does include the individual’s
right to participate in general in the state’s legal process, which has been an essential
basis of human rights law, despite being defined by vague norms and having disputed
meanings in the international community. See id.
346. See supra Part II.B.
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fication for a civil tort system in small claims cases.347 Human
rights claims, even where great harm is alleged, may be analogized to small claims classes where there are severe disincentives to individually litigate the claims. However, even when a
class of claims is litigated, deterrence may not be effective if
the cost of litigation is less than the cost of altering unlawful
practices and may require the computation of litigation costs to
include the costs of avoiding injury.348
By certifying and adjudicating human rights class actions,
courts create a more even playing field for victims challenging
corporate defendants.349 The corporation is the traditional
model for collective litigation,350 enjoying its privileged status
by virtue of the state’s grant of corporate status.351 Due to the
deterrent effect of sizable class remedies, class actions may
provide a workable means for holding corporations accountable
to international human rights standards.
Given the nature of the claims being enforced in human
rights class actions, neither the theories underlying rights to
participation nor the practical objectives of enforcement of human rights for groups justify denying class treatment on
autonomy grounds.352 The class structure facilitates generalized policies of reform, deterrence, and corrective justice and
provides a forum for making broad statements of accountability
for human rights abuses on an international scale.353 Class adjudication provides the means by which the voice of human
rights victims in the international community is heard when
joined by the voice of the group within which the victim has

347. One of the justifications of the consumer class action is “that it is more important to deprive the defendant of ill-gotten gains than to deliver compensation to victims.” Marcus, supra note 106, at 889.
348. See Bone, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 570-71;
Rosenberg, supra note 121, at 878-79; Shapiro, supra note 108, at n.44.
349. See generally, Collins, supra note 183, at 18-19.
350. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 919 (stating that defendant classes with a
pre-existing coherence were often litigants in the early stages of class action development, but today, defendant class actions are rare).
351. Organizational liability for violations of international human rights law is an
under-developed area and is beyond the scope of this article.
352. Procedural rules such as Rule 23 may also fulfill the objectives of distributional justice. See Robert A. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of
Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893, 905,
908-18.
353. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2349 n.11; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291, 1298-1302 (1976).
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suffered. Justice occurs when these voices are heard at the international level.354
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal courts play a crucial role in providing a unique forum for groups aggrieved by the adverse consequences of international global corporate activity. In its application of class
procedures, courts can participate in the interpretation of international norms and expand and modify rights that would
not be available to individuals, absent the ability to enforce
them collectively. In class actions against private enterprises,
plaintiff classes may finally be the key to deterring corporate
violations of human rights.355
Implementation of class action rules in the area of human
rights litigation may achieve a greater good than simply
achieving one of the rule’s purely procedural objectives of
minimizing individual claims. The rules solidify legal rights by
providing meaningful remedies to deter violations. The virtual
absence of international accountability for corporate complicity
with government violations of human rights has allowed many
international offenders to escape liability. Class actions are the
tool necessary to institute real change. 356 Class actions do so by
preventing corporate entities from hiding behind defenses that
would ordinarily protect them against individual plaintiffs.357
The class action is an appropriate means for achieving the
behavioral, cultural, political, and societal policies underlying
Rule 23 at the international level.358 When evaluated in light of
human rights policies, the class action is necessary because individual litigation fails to further the search for fairness or jus-

354. See Collins, supra note 183, at 19 (Eizenstat, referring to the Holocaust survivors’ and families’ litigation, stated the following: “But of the hundreds of survivors
I’ve met, the great bulk are pleased all this is happening. Even though what they will
get back is a pittance, at the end of their lives at least the world finally recognized the
plight they endured.”).
355. See generally Morgan, supra note 39.
356. See Collins, supra note 183, at 18 (Eizenstate stated: “[I]t took Judge Korman
and the threat of sanctions to get the banks over the top.”).
357. See Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77
OR. L. REV. 157, 166-67 (1998).
358. See id. at 159-60, 170 (acknowledging that the Advisory Committee created
the rule with the vision of allowing vindication of a person’s rights who may not otherwise find justice).
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tice sought by our judicial process.359 In sum, human rights
class action litigation 1) crystallizes international norms for
collective rights; 2) provides collective remedies; 3) allows the
federal court to participate through transnational public law
litigation in international legal development and enforcement
of legal norms; 4) deters international actors; and 5) provides
justice for victims.

359. See id. at 158.

